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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1986, Congress passed the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act (SARA).' In part, Congress directed the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to adopt regulations
requiring owners or operators of petroleum underground stor-
age tanks (USTs) to maintain financial responsibility for "tak-
ing corrective action and compensating third parties for bodily
injury and property damage caused by sudden and nonsudden
accidental releases from operating an underground storage
tank."2 In other words, owners or operators of USTs must
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1. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9657 (1986) amended Subtitle I of the Resource and Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901--6987 (1976), as amended by the
Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984 (HSWA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991
(1984).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 6991b (c)(6) (1982 & Supp. IV 1987). The following USTs are
exempt from the financial responsibility regulations:
(1) Any UST system holding hazardous wastes listed or identified under
Subtitle C of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, or a mixture of such hazardous
waste and other regulated substances.
(2) Any wastewater treatment tank system that is part of a wastewater
treatment facility regulated under Section 402 or 307(b) of the Clean Water
Act.
(3) Equipment or machinery that contains regulated substances for
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demonstrate that they have an EPA approved source of funds
to pay clean-up costs and to compensate third parties for petro-
leum leaks.
Owners and operators of USTs can meet these financial
responsibility requirements through a variety of methods:
"insurance, guarantee, surety bond, letter of credit, qualifica-
tion as a self-insurer,"3 or participation in an EPA approved
state financial responsibility program.4 In addition, the differ-
ent methods may be used in combination to meet financial
responsibility requirements. Whatever method is used, the
minimum level of financial responsibility is set at one million
dollars per occurrence, per release or leak. The EPA may set
lower limits of financial responsibility, however, for owners
and operators of tanks without large capacity who are not
engaged in producing, refining, or marketing petroleum
products.5
As a last resort, if the EPA determines that statutorily
recognized methods of financial responsibility are generally
unavailable, the EPA may suspend enforcement of financial
responsibility requirements in a particular state for periods not
exceeding 180 days.6 But, the EPA must also find that "steps
are being taken to form a risk retention group.., or... such
state is taking steps to establish a fund [that will provide finan-
cial responsibility]."7
On October 26, 1988, the EPA published its final regula-
operational purposes such as hydraulic lift tanks and electrical equipment
tanks.
(4) Any UST system whose capacity is 110 gallons or less.
(5) Any UST system that contains a "de minimis" concentration of regulated
substances.
(6) Any emergency spill or overflow containment UST system that is
expeditiously emptied after use.
40 C.F.R. § 280.10(b) (1989)
Other USTs that are exempt from the financial responsibility regulations include UST
systems containing radioactive wastes and materials, 40 C.F.R. § 280.10(c)(2); field-con-
structed tanks, 40 C.F.R. § 280.10(c)(5); backup diesel tanks at nuclear facilities, 40
C.F.R. § 280.10(d); airport hydrant fueling systems, 40 C.F.R. § 280.10(c)(4); heating oil
tanks, 40 C.F.R. § 280.12 (1989); USTS owned by state and federal government entities
whose obligations are the obligations of a state or the United States, 40 C.F.R.
§ 280.90(c) (1989).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 6991b (d)(1). (1982 & Supp. IV 1987).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 6991b (d)(1)(D)(ii).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 6991b (d)(5).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 6991b (d)(5)(D).
7. Id.
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tions governing financial responsibility.8  The regulations
establish different financial responsibility limits and compli-
ance deadlines for various classes of owners and operators.9
Owners or operators who market petroleum 10 or who handle
an average of more than 10,000 gallons of petroleum per month
must have financial responsibility limits of $1 million per
occurrence." All other owners and operators must have per
occurrence limits of $500,000.12 Owners and operators must
have an annual aggregate limit of $2,000,000 if more than 100
tanks are owned or operated, 3 and $1,000,000 if less than 100
tanks are owned or operated.14
Petroleum marketing firms must be in compliance with
the financial responsibility regulations by January 1989 if more
than 1000 tanks are owned,' 5 by October 1989 if 100-999 tanks
are owned,'16 by April 1991 if 13-99 tanks are owned,' 7 and by
October 1991 if 1-12 tanks are owned.'" A non-marketing
owner must comply by January 1989 if the owner has a net
worth of more than $20,000,000.19 All other non-marketing
owners, including local governments, must comply by October
of 1991. 0
Despite the variety of methods available to satisfy EPA
financial responsibility regulations, few owners or operators
have the financial resources necessary to satisfy the self-insur-
ance standards or have a parent or similar company willing to
issue a guarantee that conforms to regulations." Few, if any,
8. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,322-383 (1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 280-281).
9. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,346-353 (1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 280.97).
10. Marketers are defined as those owners and operators whose tanks are located
at a petroleum marketing facility. 40 C.F.R. § 280.92(j) (1989). Petroleum marketing
facilities include "all facilities at which petroleum is produced or refined and all
facilities from which petroleum is sold or transferred to other petroleum marketers or
to the public." 40 C.F.R. § 280.92(i).
11. 40 C.F.R. § 280.93 (a)(1). Occurrence is defined as "an accident, including
continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in a release from an
underground storage tank." 40 C.F.R. § 280.92(g).
12. 40 C.F.R. § 280.93 (a)(2).
13. 40 C.F.R. § 280.93 (b)(1).
14. 40 C.F.R. § 280.93 (b)(2).
15. 40 C.F.R. § 280.90(a).
16. 40 C.F.R. § 280.90(b).
17. 40 C.F.R. § 280.90(c).
18. 40 C.F.R. § 280.91(d). The year of compliance was extended from 1990 to 1991
by the EPA on March 15, 1990. See 55 Fed. Reg. 24,693.
19. 40 C.F.R. § 280.91(a).
20. 40 C.F.R. § 280.91(d).
21. General Accounting Office, Report to Congress No. GAO/RCED-88-39,
SUPERFUND Insuring Underground Petroleum Tanks, at 35-6 (1988) [hereinafter
1990]
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financial institutions or other corporations will issue a surety
bond or letter of credit conforming to EPA regulations.2'
Therefore, most owners and operators will be forced to
purchase insurance or similar coverage from a risk retention
group unless a state fund is available.'
Unfortunately, financial responsibility coverage through
insurance companies and risk retention groups has become less
rather than more available in the past year because of several
factors. First, the cost of such insurance is very high. Second,
owners and operators have difficulty in qualifying for coverage.
Third, a few major providers of pollution liability coverage
have withdrawn from the insurance market.' Given the
inability of owners and operators to comply with financial
responsibility regulations, Washington state owners and opera-
GAO Report]. The financial requirements are specified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 280.95 and
280.96.
22. GAO Report, supra note 21, at 39-40. The GAO Report concluded:
Because of the gaps in coverage and the currently limited availability,
methods other than insurance may not provide tank owners and operators
with adequate alternatives to insurance for complying with UST financial
responsibility requirements at this time. As a result, the majority of tank
owners may be faced with the dilemma of how to comply with the impending
financial responsibility requirements.
Id. at 43.
23. Risk retention groups were created and authorized by Congress under the
Risk Retention Act of 1981, 15 U.S.C. § 3901-06 (1989). The Act authorizes the
formation of entities that operate in a fashion similar to insurance companies but
exempt the entities from most state insurance regulations. The Act generally permits
commercial and pollution liability risks to be transferred to a risk retention group that
is owned by the persons covered. A risk retention group must comprise owners with
similar risks and a group cannot sell coverage to the public. See General Accounting
Office, Report HRD-86-120BR, "Insurance: Activity Under the Product Liability Risk-
Retention Act of 1981," July 1986.
24. In February 1990, Petromark, a pollution liability risk retention group and
major issuer of pollution coverage, discontinued writing coverage after it was placed
under Tennessee state supervision. The group's actuary projected that the group had a
negative net worth of $10.5 million as of December 31, 1989 as a result of loss forecasts.
Letter from Scott F. Blankenship, President of Petromark, to policyholders (February
8, 1990) (copy on file with the University of Puget Sound Law Review) [hereinafter
Petromark Letter].
Additionally, Federated Mutual, an insurance company and a major insurer of
underground storage tanks, has significantly increased insurance rates after
unexpected losses. Oil Express, Dec. 12, 1988, at 2.
In January 1990, Environmental Protection Insurance Company, a major risk
retention group, discontinued business. Pollution Liability News, January 15, 1990, at
4. Other insurance companies are expressing an interest in entering the pollution
insurance market and some have recently announced plans to market coverage.
Crittenden Excess & Surplus Insider, January 29, 1990, at 2-3. However, this
availability of coverage does nothing to assist owners and operators if the price for
coverage is too high.
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tors sought creation of a state program of financial responsibil-
ity assurance. 25
This Article reviews Washington state efforts to create a
state financial responsibility assurance program; it analyzes
EPA financial responsibility regulations; it examines the risks
associated with insuring underground petroleum storage tanks;
and it assesses the problems and merits of the state pollution
liability insurance program as a potential solution to owner
and operator financial responsibility needs. The Article con-
cludes that the Washington program reflects the best efforts of
the legislature to compromise the competing interests of the
public, owners and operators of USTs, and environmental
groups. If pollution insurers bargain in good faith with the
state, the program will succeed in creating an affordable pollu-
tion insurance market in Washington while creating a profita-
ble business opportunity for insurers.
II. PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT
In 1988, the Washington State Legislature created the
Joint Select Committee on Underground Storage Tanks to
study and recommend legislation to assist owners and opera-
tors of USTs in complying with federal financial responsibility
regulations.26 In the months before the 1989 legislative session,
the Joint Committee met, in part to consider various proposals
to create a financial responsibility insurance program for own-
ers and operators.' The Committee sought to answer three
basic questions: first, the kind of insurance coverage the state
is being asked to provide; second, its cost; and third, the man-
ner in which it should be provided.
25. See Independent Business Assoc. of Washington Report (1988) (copy on file
with the University of Puget Sound Law Review).
26. 1988 Wash. Laws, ch. 215 § 3(4). The legislation directed the Committee to
make recommendations on
the advisability of and methods for establishing an owner and operator funded
program that assures compliance with the federal requirements and which
limits the state's liability, including the advisability of state administration of
risk retention pools designed to provide financial responsibility for owners
and operators who cannot obtain adequate and reasonably priced private
insurance.
Id.
27. "Issues-Underground Storage Tank Bill," memorandum from Bonnie Austin,
Counsel, to House Environmental Affairs Committee, to Representative Roy Ferguson
and Senator Mike Kriedler, Chairmen of the Joint Select Committee on Underground
Storage Tanks (August 11, 1988) (copy on file at the University of Puget Sound Law
Review).
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A. Financial Responsibility Insurance Coverage
Obviously, Washington state could choose to reject any
request for pollution insurance coverage assistance. However,
if the state provides such assistance, the amount and kind of
insurance coverage that the owner or operator requires must
meet EPA regulations. EPA financial responsibility regula-
tions establish the qualifying standards for any contract, agree-
ment, or insurance policy which will serve as proof of
compliance with financial responsibility assurance.28 These
regulations hold a state program to the same standards that
are applied to other methods of obtaining financial responsibil-
ity assurance. 29 Thus, a state program providing complete
financial responsibility assurance must cover owner or opera-
tor liabilities at least to the same extent as an insurance com-
pany issuing a qualifying pollution liability policy.
Owners or operators of petroleum USTs "must maintain
evidence of all financial assurance mechanisms used to demon-
strate financial responsibility . ... ."I Evidence of financial
responsibility must conform word for word to the certification
form adopted by the EPA for each method of assurance."'
These forms incorporate the required terms and conditions of
financial responsibility coverage. s2 However, the EPA recog-
nized that too narrowly defined terms and conditions would
conflict with and potentially kill private insurance as a method
of financial responsibility assurance, the method most owners
or operators will use.s 3
An insurance policy meets EPA standards if it covers the
insured's liability for corrective action, and third party bodily
injury and property damage "caused by accidental releases
arising from the operation of USTs." 34 Coverage limits must
28. 40 C.F.R. § 280 (1989).
29. 40 C.F.R. § 280.101(a). An owner or operator may satisfy EPA financial
responsibility through a state assurance program "if the Regional Administrator
determines that the state's assurance is at least equivalent to the financial mechanisms
specified in this subpart." Id.
30. 40 C.F.R. § 280.107(a).
31. 40 C.F.R. § 280.107(b).
32. Id.
33. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,348-49. 'The Agency recognizes that insurance and state
financial assurance programs are likely to be the most feasible mechanisms for most
owners and operators to comply with [the financial responsibility regulations]." Id. at
43,325. Therefore, the EPA declared as one of its goals "the need to preserve
flexibility in policy specifications to allow insurers to develop acceptable policies." Id.
at 43,348.
34. 40 C.F.R. § 280.97 (b).
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be exclusive of defense costs and in an amount appropriate for
the owner or operator insured.35 Coverage may be provided on
a claims-made basis and must offer a six month extended
reporting period.' The policy may be cancelled only after the
insured receives 60 days prior written notification of cancella-
tion,s or 10 days notice in the case of cancellation for nonpay-
ment of premiums.-8 Finally, the insurer must provide
coverage within the policy limits without regard to the
insured's payment of any deductible 39 and without regard to
the insured's bankruptcy or insolvency.4°
Each of these elements of coverage are partially defined in
the financial responsibility regulations. 41 Coverage for acciden-
tal releases must include both sudden and nonsudden releases
"neither expected nor intended by the tank owner or opera-
tor."'  As noted earlier, regulatory definitions were intended
35. 40 C.F.R. § 280.97. The EPA did not want coverage limits for corrective action
to be reduced by defense costs. However, "the insurer is free, as many insurers are
currently doing, to limit defense costs in some way outside of policy limits." 53 Fed.
Reg. 43,352 (1988). On November 9, 1989, the EPA published an interim final rule
amending the certification of financial responsibility form required for insurance
policies by requiring the form to indicate that legal defense costs are subject to a
separate limit of coverage. 54 Fed. Reg. 47,081 (1989).
36. 40 C.F.R. § 280.97(b)(1)2. e. Claims-made as compared to "occurrence" policies
eliminate the "long tail" of insurance company exposure to claim losses by requiring a
loss to occur and be reported during the policy period. Occurrence based policies
require only that the loss occur during the policy period. The EPA extended reporting
period requires companies issuing claims-made policies to permit the insured an
additional six months after the policy period to report a claim that occurred during the
policy period. See 53 Fed. Reg. 43,349-50 (1988).
37. 40 C.F.R. § 280.97(1)2. d.
38. 54 Fed. Reg. 47,082 (1989) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 280.105 (a)(2)).
39. 40 C.F.R. § 280.97(1)2. b.
40. 40 C.F.R. § 280.97(1)2. a. Because an insurance company will be responsible
for the policyholder's deductible, insurers will need to examine a prospective
policyholder's ability to pay a deductible in order to guarantee that the insurer will be
able to recover the deductible amount from the policyholder. Insurers will be
reluctant to provide insurance with a high deductible and corresponding reduction in
premium if the insurer would be stuck with paying the deductible. In some instances,
an insurer would be better advised to charge a high premium with a very low
deductible or to require the policyholder to formally set aside or segregate the
deductible amount from the policyholder's assets in a manner guaranteeing payment
of the deductible. See 53 Fed. Reg. 43,349 (EPA discussion of first dollar coverage).
Third party claims and corrective action claims may be asserted directly against an
insurance company "[i]n any case where the owner or operator is in bankruptcy,
reorganization, or arrangement pursuant to the Federal Bankruptcy Code or where
with reasonable diligence jurisdiction in any State court of the [sic] Federal Courts
cannot be obtained over an owner or operator likely to be solvent at the time of
judgment .... " 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(d)(2) (1982 & Supp. VI 1988).
41. 40 C.F.R. § 280.92 (1989).
42. 40 C.F.R. § 280.92 (a). Thus, the EPA regulations require coverage of gradual
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to coincide with standard insurance industry usage to avoid
conflict with existing pollution liability insurance policies. The
EPA went so far as to include this philosophy in a note to the
definition of "occurrence":
This definition is intended to assist in the understanding of
these regulations and is not intended to limit the meaning of
"occurrence" in a way that conflicts with standard insurance
usage or to prevent the use of other standard insurance
terms in place of "occurrence." 3
Despite this reticence, the EPA reserved the right to develop
more specific coverage standards in the future."
In contrast, corrective action is not defined in the financial
responsibility regulations. In the preamble to the regulations,
the EPA notes that "corrective action coverage will be
required only for cleanup of releases required by [40 CFR sub-
part F and section 280.72] of the technical standards or ordered
by the implementing agency."45 Assuming the EPA approves
pollution. Before liability insurance companies amended their comprehensive general
liability policy forms in the mid-eighties to exclude pollution claims absolutely, policies
covered pollution "if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and
accidental." United Pac. Ins. v. Van's Westlake Union, 34 Wash. App. 708, 712, 664 P.2d
1262, 1265 (1983) (emphasis added). The United Pacific court held that this pollution
exclusion did not exclude third party claims caused when an underground pipe at a gas
station leaked 80,000 gallons of gasoline over a three month period. Id. See also Brett,
Insuring Against Superfund, 6 J. OF ENVTL L. 1, 47-48 (1986); Cross, Hazardous Waste
Insurance Law, The Quest for Coverage, 28 NEw HAMPSIRE B. J., 245, 249-51 (1987)
[hereinafter Hazardous Waste Insurance Law].
The EPA decided not to address the meaning of such words as "expected" or
"intended" in the definition of accidental release because such words are common to
insurance policy definitions and "interpretation of such terms [should be left] to
private insurance law." 53 Fed. Reg. 43,334 (1988).
43. 40 C.F.R § 280.92 (g). An occurrence includes "continuous and repeated
exposure to conditions, which results in a release from an underground storage tank."
Id. However, insurers are free to use any phrase of choice to describe the coverage
triggering event, e.g. "pollution incident." 53 Fed. Reg. 43,333 (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. § 280.92).
44. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,334. "The Agency has the authority under RCRA [42 U.S.C.]
§ 9003(d)(1) to specify acceptable and unacceptable liability insurance policy terms in
the future." Id.
45. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,348 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 280.97). Subpart F of the
technical regulations governs owner or operator initial response action, 40 C.F.R.
§ 280.61; initial abatement measures and site check, 40 C.F.R. § 280.62; initial site
characterization, 40 C.F.R. § 280.63; free product removal, 40 C.F.R. § 280.64;
investigations for soil and ground-water cleanup, 40 C.F.R. § 280.65; and corrective
action plans, 40 C.F.R. § 280.66. Corrective action may also be required under subpart
F if the site assessment required at the time of site closure or a change in the service
status of the tanks reveals contamination. 40 C.F.R. § 280.72.
Site assessments mandated by § 280.72 should be excluded by an insurer to avoid
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of Washington's underground storage tank regulatory program,
the implementing agency will be the Washington State Depart-
ment of Ecology (Department of Ecology).46
These corrective action regulations provide only an outline
of owner and operator liability and thus, create difficulty for
insurers who must predict the costs of providing corrective
action coverage. Insurers must cover the costs of corrective
action that are necessary to "protect human health and the
environment." 47  This open-ended requirement includes initial
action to stop any leak,48 contain the damage, 49 and conduct a
site assessment;50 action to recover petroleum;5' and action to
develop 52 and implement a cleanup plan. 3 Moreover, EPA
corrective action requirements serve only as baseline standards
that can be enlarged by the Department of Ecology.'
Ultimately, insurance claim payments for corrective action
will be partially determined by the skill and aggressiveness of
the insurance company in negotiating with the Department of
Ecology for a settlement agreement covering corrective action
any question as to whether a policy affords coverage of these costs. Such costs are
routine maintenance costs that may be excluded. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,348 (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. § 280.97). Some pollution liability insurers cover the costs of a site
assessment when the assessment reveals contamination covered by the policy. For
example, Petromark's policy, which was filed with the Washington State Insurance
Commissioner's Office, excludes from the definition of covered "damages," the costs of
"testing for a suspected Environmental Impairment if the results of the testing
indicate that there has been no Environmental Impairment." Petromark Insurance
Company, Policy Form and Rating Plan in Effect as of February 9, 1988, Policy Form,
§ II B(3)(d) (copy on file with the University of Puget Sound Law Review).
46. To gain EPA approval, a state underground storage tank regulatory program
must be "no less stringent than the corresponding federal [UST regulations]" and the
state "must also demonstrate that it has a program that provides adequate
enforcement of compliance with these requirements." 40 C.F.R. § 281.11(b).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).




52. 40 C.F.R. § 280.63(c).
53. 40 C.F.R. § 280.64(c).
54. 40 C.F.R. § 280.61(c). Each of the corrective action sections of the EPA
technical regulations grant authority to the state implementing agency to supersede,
enlarge, and otherwise apply corrective action standards. Id. For example, EPA
requirements for owner and operator initial abatement measures are preceded by the
conditioning phrase "unless directed to do otherwise by the implementing agency." 40
C.F.R. § 280.62(c) (1987). The only standards that owners and operators must follow
and that may not be changed by the implementing agency are those concerning initial
response to a leak, 40 C.F.R. § 280.61(a) (1987); and those concerning product removal
from the environment, 40 § C.F.R. 280.64.
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liability.- This skill will be particularly important in devising
cleanup plans that require a "site specific" approach taking
into consideration both developing cleanup technology and site
environmental factors.' Incompetence in devising such plans
will result in greater than necessary expenditures to satisfy
cleanup standards. However, insurers issuing liability policies
in Washington will remain in the dark as to their exposure to
liability for corrective action until the Department of Ecology
clarifies the state policy approach to cleanup by adopting rules
governing cleanup standards and negotiating several UST
cleanups.57
Even after the Department of Ecology establishes such
cleanup standards, the insurer must consider how it will treat
the liability that could arise if "factors not known at the time
of entry [into] the settlement agreement are discovered and
present a previously unknown threat to human health or the
environment."'  To add another complication to determining
the extent of corrective action coverage, the owner or opera-
55. The Model Toxics Control Act allows owners and operators to settle their
liability under the Act by consent decree. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105D.040(4)(b) (1989).
To obtain the consent decree, the Department of Ecology must find, after public notice
and hearing, that the "proposed settlement would lead to a more expeditious cleanup
of hazardous substances in compliance with cleanup standards ...... WASH. REV.
CODE § 70.105D.040(4)(a) (1989).
56. 53 Fed. Reg. 37,174 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 280.60-280.70). Cleanup plans
must consider the following site factors:
(1) The physical and chemical characteristics of the regulated substance,
including its toxicity, persistence, and potential for migration;
(2) The hydrogeologic characteristics of the facility and the surrounding area;
(3) The proximity, quality, and current and future uses of nearby surface
water and ground water,
(4) The potential effects of residual contamination on nearby surface water
and ground water,
(5) An exposure assessment; and
(6) Any information assembled in compliance with this subpart.
40 C.F.R. § 280.66.
57. On January 3, 1990, the Department of Ecology published proposed rules
implementing the state Model Toxics Control Act which also governs petroleum
releases, 90-91 Wash. St. Reg., at 225 (WSR 90-02-098). On March 9, 1990, the
Department of Ecology issued draft cleanup standards for hazardous substances. On
March 22, 1990, the Department of Ecology issued draft corrective action standards for
USTs to be incorporated into the proposed corrective action regulations under the
Model Toxics Control Act. These new UST rules are intended to meet EPA standards
for delegation of UST regulatory responsibility to the state and to duplicate EPA UST
corrective action regulations. Memorandum from Phyllis Baas to the Department of
Ecology Cleanup Standards Advisory Committee (March 22, 1990) (copy on file with
the University of Puget Sound Law Review).
58. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105D.040(4)(c). Every settlement agreement must
contain this liability reopener provision. Id.
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tor's permanent potential liability for these factors defeats the
purpose of claims-made insurance policy forms, which is to
eliminate the need for long term claim reserves.5 9 While the
lack of a clearer definition or explanation of corrective action
generates uncertainty, the EPA attempted to limit uncertainty
by establishing some definitional standards for other aspects of
coverage.
For example, the EPA provided limited definitions for
"bodily injury"'6  and "property damage. "61 These terms are
subject to state law interpretations except for those liabilities
traditionally excluded by insurers.62 The EPA expressed con-
cern that uniform national definitions would create confusion
and complications if lawsuits were brought in state courts by
third party claimants requiring a judicial review of both
national and state definitions of these terms.63 However, the
EPA prohibited property damage coverage exclusions related
to corrective action."
States are split over the question of whether comprehen-
sive general liability policy definitions of property damages
include the cost of correction action.6' Insurers have long
argued that property damages do not include costs related to
government ordered corrective action because corrective action
costs are injunctive or restitutionary in nature.6' In Washing-
ton, this argument was settled when the state supreme court
held that "response costs in response to actual releases of haz-
59. If the insurance policy treats a potential reopened claim as a claim that has
been previously reported, the insurer must calculate the probability of future
corrective action and must reserve accordingly. If the insurance policy treats a
potential reopened claim as a new claim requiring the owner or operator to have
coverage at the time the claim is reopened, the insurer faces renewed exposure to
policy limits. Of course, this discussion presumes that that an insurer will have the
option of drafting a policy that treats reopened claims as new claims and presumes
such policy terms would be sustained if challenged by an owner or operator.
60. 40 C.F.R. § 280.91 (1987).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,334 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 280.92).
64. 40 C.F.R. § 280.92 (k).
65. For cases holding that damages do not include cleanup costs see: Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Armco Inc., 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 484 U.S. 1008
(1988); Continental Insurance Co. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical ("NEPACCO"), 842
F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1988). For cases holding that damages include cleanup costs see New
Castle v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 673 F. Supp. 1359 (D. Del. 1987);
United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Thomas Solvent, 683 F. Supp. 1139 (W.D.
Mich. 1988).
66. See Hazardous Waste Insurance Law, supra note 42, at 252-55.
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ardous wastes are 'damages' within the meaning of [compre-
hensive general liability] coverage clauses at issue."67 Perhaps
in anticipation of insurers' attempt to redefine property dam-
age to clearly exclude corrective action costs, the EPA prohib-
ited such exclusions in policies issued for compliance with the
financial responsibility regulations."
The EPA did not directly address allowable insurance pol-
icy exclusions. As a result, the acceptability of particular pol-
icy exclusions must be inferred from EPA's explanations of its
regulations. For example, many pollution liability insurance
policies exclude coverage of on-site cleanup costs. 6 9 While the
regulations do not explicitly prohibit on-site cleanup exclu-
sions, policies that contain such an exclusion do not qualify as
a method of financial responsibility assurance under the EPA
regulations.70 Despite this overall uncertainty, some exclusions
are indirectly allowed by EPA regulations addressing other
forms of financial responsibility assurance. 71
Regulations governing financial responsibility assurance
through the use of guarantees, letters of credit, surety bonds,
and trust funds incorporate five specific exclusions.7 2 These
forms of financial responsibility assurance have no generally
accepted private market counterparts that can be relied upon
to provide guidance concerning standards, terms, and condi-
tions related to pollution liability exposure.7" Unlike the
67. Boeing v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 113 Wash. 2d 869, 887, 874 P.2d 507, 516
(1990).
68. 40 C.F.R. § 280.92(k).
69. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,361.
70. The EPA notes in the preamble to the regulations that since liability for
corrective action does not differentiate between owned and non-owned property, "the
Agency is requiring that on-site corrective action be covered by all financial
responsibility mechanisms...." 53 Fed. Reg. 43,348.
A puzzling aspect of the EPA's discussion of on-site cleanup is the statement that
the "EPA is not mandating that acceptable insurance policies cover response actions
that are part of routine maintenance of the tank site, site restoration and
enhancement." rd. (emphasis added). What does the EPA mean when it says that
insurers need not cover site restoration? More importantly, what happens to an
insurance company's liability under a policy containing a limited exclusion for certain
kinds of cleanup and the implementing agency requires cleanup which conflicts with
the exclusion? Afterall, the policy must cover "corrective action" and "corrective
action" is whatever the environmental agency legally demands.
71. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,348. See also R. LEVY & L. FOSTER, UNDERGROUND TANK LEAK
INSURANCE... MAXIMIZING YOUR COVERAGE (1988).
72. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,364. These exclusions are found at 40 C.F.R. § 280.96(c)(8)
(guarantee exclusions); 40 C.F.R. § 280.98(b)(a)-(e) (surety bond); 40 C.F.R.
§ 280.99(b)(2)(a)-(e) (letter of credit); and 40 C.F.R. § 280.103(b)(1) (trust agreement).
73. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,361.
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EPA's flexibility with respect to acceptable insurance policy
exclusions, the explicit exclusions for other forms of assurance
are mandatory. The exclusions are contained in the coverage
description for each alternative method of assurance and must
be followed verbatim.74
Claims covered by workers' compensation, disability bene-
fits, unemployment compensation, or similar laws are
excluded,75 as are employee bodily injury claims arising from,
and in the course of employment of the owner or operator.76
Bodily injury or property damage claims arising from the own-
ership, maintenance, or use of aircraft, motor vehicles, or
watercraft are excluded.77 Property damage claims for prop-
erty owned, leased, in the care, custody, or control of the
owner or operator, are excluded if the damage is not the direct
result of an underground storage tank release.7' Finally,
claims arising from the owner or operator's assumption of lia-
bility under a contract or agreement are excluded so long as
the contract or agreement was not made for purposes of finan-
cial responsibility assurance.79 Clearly, these exclusions would
be permitted in an insurance policy. 80 However, if an insur-
ance policy contains exclusionary terms that the EPA believed
failed to meet financial assurance standards, the EPA would
refuse to recognize the policy as proof of financial
responsibility."'
The EPA also recognizes exclusions for pre-existing condi-
tions.8 2 However, unless a pre-existing release is fairly old, not
only is it nearly impossible to prove that an underground stor-
74. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 280.96(c), which provides:
(c) The guarantee must be worded as follows . . . (8) The guarantor's
obligation does not apply to any of the following: . .. (a) Any obligation of
[insert owner or operator] under a workers' compensation, disability benefits,
or unemployment compensation law or other similar law;...





80. The permitted exclusions for non-insurance forms of financial responsibility
"are patterned on existing standard exclusions found in insurance coverage . . .The
five exclusions do not represent all common insurance policy exclusions, but were
selected because they were considered most relevant to the financial assurance
mechanisms for liability... " Id. at 43,361.
81. Id. at 43,334.
82. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,350. The EPA also acknowledged that insurers would establish
strict underwriting standards to prevent issuance of a policy to an owner or operator
who has a leaking tank or otherwise has an existing pollutioi problem and noted that
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age tank leak pre-dates the policy coverage period, but it is also
difficult, if not impossible, to differentiate between new and
old releases.a3 An insurer should not rely upon expert services
to deny claims for prior releases when the insurer can avoid
the claim entirely by refusing coverage for polluted sites.
Nevertheless, the rejection of applications to insure polluted
sites requires a thorough and time consuming UST site assess-
ment that many owners and operators can neither afford nor
await."
The preceding description of financial responsibility estab-
lishes the minimum coverage requirements that a state pro-
gram must meet to qualify as a method for complete financial
responsibility assurance. Nevertheless, a state program may
provide a lower level of benefits such as corrective action cov-
erage only.' Such a program would require owners and opera-
tors to find private sources to supplement the limited state
benefits. 86
B. The Cost of Financial Responsibility Insurance Coverage
Financial responsibility coverage requirements define the
risks that a state program will assume, namely, the risk of
third party and corrective action liability. These risks must be
analyzed in conjunction with information related to individual
owners and operators and to those UST sites that have been
proposed for coverage by a state program. This analysis, cou-
pled with an understanding of the expenses associated with
administering coverage, provide a framework for projecting
probable insurance program costs.
Stated differently, projecting the costs of a state reinsur-
ance program first requires a generic understanding of the
characteristics of underground storage tanks and the practices
of UST owners or operators that affect the potential frequency
and severity of pollution claims. The second step requires a
specific understanding of the characteristics of tanks and the
"insurers will be able to require correction of existing releases as a condition for
coverage." Id.
83. Applied Geotechnology, Consultation Report on UST Release Risks and
Remediation Costs for the Washington State Pollution Liability Reinsurance Program,
(November 8, 1989) [hereinafter "Consultation Report"] (on file with the University of
Puget Sound Law Review).
84. Id. at 5. See also Pollution Liability News, January 15, 1990, at 1.
85. 40 C.F.R. § 280.94 (1988).
86. Id. The EPA allows owners and operators to use several methods of financial
responsibility assurance in combination to satisfy regulatory requirements. Id.
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practices of owners or operators covered by a state program.
The second step also requires an understanding of the proce-
dures and activities necessary both to grant and administer
coverage under a state program. Ultimately, the design of the
state program determines the second step of the analysis.
A state cannot affect the scientific reality of the risk of
loss associated with certain tank and site characteristics. How-
ever, a state can affect the degree of risk assumed through
selectivity in granting coverage and through adoption and
enforcement of regulations that change the risk assumed. A
state need not insure every tank and site. Furthermore, a state
can require the installation of more reliable tanks and related
systems.
This ability to directly affect risks through regulation gives
a state critical advantages over private insurance companies.
The state can control both the financial responsibility assur-
ance program and the enforcement of underground storage
tank technical regulations.8 7 However, lack of close coopera-
tion between the agency responsible for providing financial
assurance and the agency enforcing UST regulation destroys
the advantages over the private insurance market.
Much of the information regarding tank and site charac-
teristics that affects the risk of pollution comes from public
and private studies. Unfortunately, the best and most tradi-
tional source of this information is limited, namely, insurance
company loss statistics." "Pollution claims are a relatively
recent phenomenon and insurers, although paying claims
based on past policies, do not have extensive data on exposures
and losses." 9  Moreover, the value of any historic data
decreases as clean-up and storage tank technology changes.'
Thus, projecting the costs associated with UST insurance cov-
erage requires an ability to shoot at and hit a moving target.
At a minimum, UST regulations that require improvements in
tanks and related systems present insurers with a constantly
changing pollution liability risk.91 Therefore, cost projections
87. Technical regulations govern the design, construction, and installation of USTs
and state regulations must be no less stringent than EPA technical standards. 40
C.F.R. §§ 280.110-112 (1989).
88. D'Arcy & Herricks, Pricing Insurance for Pollution Damage, 42 CPCU J. 74,
74-84 (June 1989) [hereinafter D'Arcy & Herricks].
89. Id. at 79.
90. Id.
91. EPA regulations governing the upgrade of underground storage tank systems
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are extremely dependent on the time period during which they
were made. Such cost projections therefore require an on-
going appraisal of pollution risks as well as a knowledge of
clean-up technology.92
The frequency and severity of potential losses arising from
underground storage tank releases are primarily dependent
upon site and tank characteristics.s3 Relevant site characteris-
tics include the geography, location, and history of the site.
Relevant tank characteristics include tank age and material,
tank corrosion protection systems, and pollution control
systems.
1. Site Characteristics
Site geography contributes both to the risk that a tank and
piping will corrode and to the degree of damage that can be
expected should a release occur. The degree to which a tank
and piping will corrode depends upon soil type and chemis-
try;9 4 moreover, "corrosion more than any other cause results
in tank failures."95 Corrosion is an electro-chemical process
whereby the tank material degrades to a more natural state.96
The EPA describes this process as follows:
The metal UST system and its underground surroundings
are phased in over a period of years depending, in part, upon the age and material of
the existing tank. These regulations are summarized in U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, MUSTS FOR USTs, (September 1988) [hereinafter MuSTS FOR
USTS].
92. Katzman, Pollution Liability Insurance and Catastrophic Environmental
Risk, 55 J. OF RISK AND INS., 75, 85 (1988) (hereinafter Katzman]. As Katzman notes,
"[]ecause chemical disasters are such rare events, the computation of premiums on
the basis of loss experience is virtually impossible. Even if historical loss data were
available, they would reflect outmoded safety technologies." Id.
93. Gulledge, Developing a Pollution Liability Insurance Underwriting Modek
Managing for the Potential Earposure from Toxic Releases, 11 THE ENVTL. PROF., 447,
447-453 (1989) [hereinafter Gulledge].
94. Katzman, supra note 92, at 92. See also Predpall, Rogers, & Lamont, An
Underground Tank Spill Prevention Program, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NWWA/API
CONFERENCE ON PETROLEUM HYDROCARBONS AND ORGANIC CHEMICALS IN GROUND
WATER- PREVENTION, DETECTION, AND RESTORATION, at 17-30, (1984) (discussion of
mathematical modeling and analysis system to measure soil corrosivity and leak risk)
[hereinafter Predpall, Rogers, & Lamont]. "The relevant variables governing
electrochemical reaction in the tank environment are electrical resistivity of the soil,
ph (acidity), moisture content, sulfide content of the soil and size of the tank." Id. at
24. Use of the soil corrosion test described by the authors "is a quick, reliable, and
cost-effective technique for estimating the risk of tank leakage." Id. at 27.
95. Ecology and Environment, Inc. and Whitman, Requardt & Associates, TOXIC
SUBSTANCE STORAGE TANK CONTAINMENT 80 (1985) [hereinafter ToxIc SUBSTANCE].
96. Id. at 80-92.
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act like a battery. Part of the UST can become negatively
charged and another part positively charged. Moisture in
the soil provides the connecting link that turns these UST
"batteries" on. Then, the negatively charged part of the
UST system-where the current exits from the tank or its
piping--begins to deteriorate. As electrical current passes
through this part, the hard metal begins to turn into soft ore,
holes form, and leaks begin.'
A 1984 study of leaking USTs considered soil conditions as a
contributing factor to tank corrosion and concluded that the
most "important factor affecting electrical conductivity is soil
moisture content.""s On this basis, the report found that the
Puget Sound Region in Washington has a soil corrosion poten-
tial that ranked from high to very high.9 However, other
experts warn that "tank leak prediction is site specific and
requires on-site investigation. Regional generalizations, even
to small regions, are invariably wrong and misleading."'"
Soil conditions also affect the speed with which petroleum
products reach ground water and thus, soil conditions and the
presence and use of ground water in turn affect the severity of
expected losses.101 The speed with which a leak of petroleum
products will reach ground water is dependent upon the poros-
ity, permeability, and absorptive capacity of the soil; the depth
and conditions of ground water at the time of leak; and the size
of the leak. °2 In other words, a tank located in highly corro-
sive, porous soil above ground water that is used by nearby res-
idents as a source of drinking water presents a very high risk
compared to a tank located in moderately corrosive soil in a
dry, remote region of the state.0 3
97. MUSTS FOR USTs, supra note 91, at 6-6.
98. Versar, Inc., LEAKING UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANKS CONTAINING ENGINE
FUEi, report prepared under EPA contract No. 68-02-3968, at 38 (September 5, 1984)
[hereinafter Leaking USTs].
99. Id. at 39-42.
100. Rogers, "Predicting and Detecting Tank Leaks: The Economics of UST
Integrity," paper presented at University of New Mexico UST conference at 4 (April
1989) [hereinafter Rogers] (copy on file at the University of Puget Sound Law Review).
101. Predpall, Rogers, & Lamont, supra note 94, at 23-30; see also Yaniga,
HYDROCARBON RETRIEVAL AND APPARENT HYDROCARBON THICKNESS:
INTERRELATIONSHIPS TO RECHARGING/DISCHARGING AQUIFER CONDITIONS, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NWWA/API CONFERENCE ON PETROLEUM HYDROCARBONS AND
ORGANIC CHEMICALS IN GROUND WATERS-PREVENTION, DETECTION, AND
RESTORATION, at 299-329 [hereinafter Yaniga].
102. Yaniga, supra note 101, at 299-300.
103. See generally Gulledge, supra note 93, at 450.
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The location of a site also affects the severity of a potential
loss. A tank site in a densely populated residential neighbor-
hood constitutes a far greater potential risk of damage and/or
injury than a tank site located miles from any other business
or residence.'04 For example, "depending upon site conditions,
the greatest risk to the population may be due to explosion
since gasoline vapors can find their way into buried utilities,
basements, and other such structures. ' ' 1°5 Adjacent property
use and value may result in higher costs to compensate third
parties, such as businesses, whose operations are disrupted by
clean-up efforts.1 6
Site history is relevant in determining the risk of loss for
existing or prior pollution.10 7 Because of the technical difficul-
ties in pinpointing the timing of gradual leaks, an insurer may
be unable to deny coverage for pollution that occurred prior to
issuance of the policy despite an exclusion for pre-existing con-
ditions. 08 At a minimum, an insurer must discover whether
the site has previously been the target of a government
cleanup action or the target of third party claims or lawsuits
for pollution related damages. Prior property uses may also
reveal risks related to other hazardous substances that could
create problems when attempting settlement of corrective
action liability related to petroleum releases. How could an
insurer successfully argue for, let alone accomplish, cleanup of
only petroleum products? Finally, prior owners or operators of
104. See SoIms CONTAMINATED BY PETROLEUM: ENVIRONMENTAL & PUBLIC
HEALTH EFFECTS, 231-255 (E. Calabrese & P. Kostecki ed. 1988). For example, when a
neighborhood service station's 4,000 gallon capacity tank leaked over 100,000 gallons of
gasoline, residences in the neighborhood were contaminated. As part of a settlement
agreement with the state of New York, "the spiller will offer to purchase 21 homes
(five have already been purchased), and proceed with a testing program that will
protect the families that remain." Id. at 255.
105. Id. at 184. In discussing risk assessment at sites where leaks have occurred,
the authors include both current and future land use and the presence of buried
utilities in considering the public health risks associated with releases in urban and
rural areas. Id.
106. See United Pac. Ins. v. Van's Westlake Union, 34 Wash. App. 708, 664 P.2d
1262 (1983). The facts of Union Pac. indicate that 80,000 gallons of gasoline leaked
through a small hole in an underground pipe over a period of months at a Union 76 gas
station located on the corner of Westlake Avenue North and Mercer Street in
downtown Seattle. The area was shut off to traffic for several weeks resulting in
"third party claims for damages resulting from the approximate 6-week closure of the
nearby businesses while the spilled gasoline was being pumped out of the ground ... 
Id. at 713, 644 P.2d at 1266.
107. Gulledge, supra note 93, at 450.
108. Katzman, supra note 92, at 87.
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the site may be held responsible for contribution toward cor-
rective action costs.1 9
2. Tank Characteristics
Tank characteristics relevant to determining the fre-
quency and severity of potential losses include age, material,
corrosion protection systems, and pollution control systems.
The age of a tank and the material of which it is comprised
determine its susceptibility to corrosion and leakage. In a
national study of documented tank leaks, the median tank age
was seventeen years at the time of leak. 110 Of these leaking
tanks, 81 percent were constructed of steel and 19 percent of
fiberglass."' The study found that the major cause of leaks for
tanks over ten years old was corrosion.1 2 For tanks under ten
years of age, structural failure, loose pipe fittings, and
improper tank installation were the major causes of leaks."3
Other studies have shown that age is not directly related to
risk because site conditions play a greater role in determining
the risk of a leak.1 1 4 In other words, the age of a tank alone is
not determinative of whether it can be expected to leak;
rather, the determining factor is the tank age in combination
with the relative adversity of site conditions.
Tank corrosion protection can reduce the risk of corrosion
related leaks and can extend the useful life of a steel tank." 5
Coating steel tanks with asphalt, which has historically been
used to lower the risk of corrosion, offers very limited protec-
tion from corrosion." 6 Other types of tank coatings or linings,
such as a fiberglass coating or lining, can significantly reduce
the risk of corrosion related leaks." 7 The installation of
cathodic protection devices is a common method used to reduce
109. WAsH. REV. CODE § 70.105D.040 (1989).
110. Analysia of the National Data Base of Underground Storage Tank Release
Incidents, EPA CONTRAcT No. 68-01-7053, by Versar, Inc., July 12, 1986 at 1-5
[hereinafter Analysis of the National Data Base] (copy on file with University of Puget
Sound Law Review).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 6-6.
113. Id.
114. Rogers, supra note 100, at 3. While tank age is relevant to the probability of
leak, the corrosive influences of the fill material surrounding a tank determines its
useful life. Id. at 5.
115. Leaking USTs, supra note 98, at 12. See also Toxic SUBSTANCE, supra note
95, at 80-106.
116. Leaking USTs, supra note 98, at 13.
117. Id. at 18.
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the risk of leak by corrosion"" and is one of the EPA required
alternatives for the installation of new tanks and for the
upgrading of existing tanks." 9 Cathodic protection is designed
to prevent metal tank corrosion by reversing the natural elec-
trochemical flow from a tank to the surrounding soil.' 2°
Obviously, early detection of a leak is necessary to limit
the severity of a loss. In the national survey of reported leak
incidents, more than 70 percent of the leaks were discovered
by sight or smell, and a significant number of leaks were dis-
covered unintentionally. 2' Owners and operators may use
many different leak detection systems to indicate that an
underground tank is losing petroleum products. The EPA
requires certain leak detection systems depending upon the age
and characteristics of the tank.122 Such systems include man-
ual inventory control (the "dipstick" method), automatic
inventory control (tank guages), soil and water monitoring
equipment, and interstitial monitoring (automatic detection of
a leak in the space between the first and second wall of a
double walled tank system).2 3 These methods differ in effec-
tiveness. For example, a national survey noted that the most
common method of leak detection in use, the manual inven-
tory control method, detected only 11 percent of the reported
leaks.'
Apart from tank technology, another important factor in
nim izing the frequency and severity of losses is owner or
operator management practices. At a minimum, if the opera-
tor is completely unaware of the risks involved or the regula-
tions governing tank operation, then the operator is neither
118. Id. at 16.
119. 40 C.F.R. §§ 280.20-.21.
120. Toxic SUBSTANCE, supra note 95, at 98. The two most common methods of
cathodic protection are the sacrificial anode and impressed current methods. With the
sacrificial anode method, a metal more corrosive than the tank's metal, is connected to
the tank so that the anode corrodes rather than the tank. Metals of this type include
magnesium, zinc, or aluminum. With the impressed current method, a direct electrical
current is applied to the soil to reverse the soil's corrosive effect by causing a greater
electrical flow to the tank rather than from the tank to the soil. Id. at 98-102. See also
Leaking USTs, supra note 98, at 16-18.
121. Leaking USTs, supra note 98 at 16-18.
122. 40 C.F.R. §§ 280.40-45 (1989).
123. Id. See also MUSTS FOR USTs, supra note 91, at 10-11, 34-35; TOXIC
SUBSTANCE, supra note 95, at 71-74; Scheinfeld, Robertson, and Schwenderman,
Underground Storage Tank Monitoring: Observation Well Based Systems, 6 GROUND
WATER MONITORING REv., 49, 49-55 (1986).
124. Analysis of National Data Base, supra note 110, at 7:1-3.
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likely to respond effectively to a leak nor likely to comply with
regulations designed to minimize risk. Most private insurers
require owners and operators to adhere to strict tank manage-
ment guidelines.2 These guidelines include owner and opera-
tor training in emergency response procedures, a regular tank
inspection and maintenance program, and strict
recordkeeping. 126
3. Prediction of Cost of a State Financial Responsibility
Program
In order to develop a more specific risk analysis and to
predict the probable costs of a state financial responsibility
program, it is necessary to acquire information concerning the
tanks that are likely to be covered by the program. Site and
tank characteristics are generic risk factors which are used to
create an analytic model of the probability of losses.' 7 Insur-
ance companies then apply this risk assessment to information
obtained from insurance applications. Finally, an actuary esti-
mates the insurance rate necessary to cover losses and other
expenses for those tanks ultimately eligible for insurance
coverage. 128
In 1984, as part of the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amend-
ments (HSWA)' to the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA), i s Congress directed underground petroleum
storage tank owners to notify the state in which the tank is
located of the existence, age, size, type, location, and uses of
the tank.'' In February of 1987, in compliance with HWSA
and RCRA requirements, the Department of Ecology issued a
report on Washington USTs. s2 The report included informa-
tion gathered by the Department of Ecology from UST notifi-
cation forms filed in response to HSWA reporting
requirements.'3 This information profiles the tank character-
istics and site locations needing financial responsibility in
"125. Fireman's Fund Insurance, Pollution Liability Insurance Application, at 5
(copy on file with the University of Puget Sound Law Review).
126. Id.
127. D'Arcy & Herricks, supra note 88, at 74-84.
128. Id.
129. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991 (1984).
130. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 6991a(a) (1982).
132. T. Lufkin, "A Report on Underground Storage Tanks" (prepared for the
Washington State the Department of Ecology) (February, 1987) [hereinafter Lufkin].
133. Id. at vi-x.
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Washington.134
In a June 1988 update of its 1987 report to the legislature,
the Department of Ecology reported that it had received notifi-
cation forms from 9,000 owners covering 34,000 tanks at 12,000
sites across Washington.' 1  Approximately eighty percent of
the tanks for which the Department of Ecology received notifi-
cation forms are privately owned, and the remaining twenty
percent are owned by different government entities. Of these
privately owned tanks, twenty-six percent are owned by ser-
vice stations." Sixty-eight percent of the tanks are located in
Western Washington, most of which are located in King
County areas designated as having a high or very high soil cor-
rosion potential 3 7
As to other characteristics of underground storage tanks
for which the Department of Ecology received notification
forms, sixty percent of the reported tanks are over 10 years of
age, and twenty-five percent are over 20 years of age."s Over
ninety percent of all reported tanks are constructed of bare
steel with no corrosion protection.13 Twenty-seven percent of
reported tank owners employ no method of leak detection."4
Another twenty-nine percent employ daily inventory of tank
contents as the sole method of leak detection.1
41
These facts translate into a rather high risk group of
USTs. The Department of Ecology's report to the legislature,
in surveying research on the probability of leaks from under-
ground tanks, found a range of leak rate estimates from 1 to 35
percent.' 42 The Department of Ecology estimated that over
1,600 tanks in Washington were leaking petroleum products at
the time of the report, and that more than three times that
number may be leaking by the year 1992.14' In part, these esti-
mates of leak rates vary widely because of the many factors
that affect the probability of a leak.
The factors discussed above can be used to estimate clean-
134. See id.
135. "Underground Storage Tank Briefing," Washington State the Department of
Ecology (June 21, 1988) [hereinafter UST Briefing].
136. Id. at 4.
137. Id. See also Leaking USTs, supra note 98, at 38.
138. UST Briefing, supra note 135, at 6.
139. Id. at 8.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Lufkin, supra note 132, at 57.
143. Id.
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up costs of UST leaks. In a study conducted by Tillinghast for
the State of Indiana, the average estimated cost for clean-up of
UST leaks in that state for 1990 was projected to be $110,000.'"
The Tillinghast study notes that studies conducted in other
states estimate the average annual cost for clean-up of UST
leaks to be between $200,000 and $300,000.'" However, Tilling-
hast points out that these cost projections are distorted by the
inclusion of large losses and the omission of claims smaller
than $50,000.1"
A study conducted by Applied Geotechnology (AGI) for
the State of Washington correlated average clean-up costs to
the size of UST leaks. 47 Milliman and Robertson (M&,) used
these correlations to project estimated clean-up costs for West-
ern Washington. It found that clean-up costs would be $35,000
per leak under 1,000 gallons, $100,000 per leak of 1,000 to 10,000
gallons, and $250,000 per leak over 10,000 gallons.148 Estimat-
ing the probability of clean-up costs, M & R found that approx-
imately 86% of the losses would occur below $102,000.1
These loss costs do not include costs to compensate third
party claimants nor do they include expenses associated with
investigating, administering, and settling claims. Such periph-
eral, non-cleanup costs can average 10% of clean-up costs.' °
M&R estimated that 5% of the leaks in Washington would
result in third party claims with an average cost in excess of
$250,000 and an average expense cost of 50% of these liability
claims.151 Moreover, loss costs do not adequately reflect the
experiences described by some owners and operators. For
example, a Wisconsin petroleum marketer reported that he
hired a consultant to study the pollution at his sites.152 He paid
144. "State of Indiana--Analysis of Funding Requirements for the Petroleum
Underground Storage Tank Excess Liability Fund" (Jan. 2, 1990), at 15-11 [hereinafter
Tillinghast Report].
145. Id. at 14-16.
146. Id. at 16.
147. Letter to Robert L. Wilkerson from John E. Newby, Table 4 (Nov. 16, 1989)
(copy on file with the University of Puget Sound Law Review).
148. Letter to Bob Wilkerson from Roger Hayne, Exhibit A-4, (Nov. 14, 1989)
(copy on file with the University of Puget Sound Law Review).
149. Id. Exhibit A-5.
150. Id. Exhibit A-3. See also Tillinghast Report, supra note 144, at 9. The
Tillinghast Report estimated 10 percent of the costs for administrative expenses and 15
percent of the third party liability costs for the payment of owner or operator legal
defense. Id.
151. Id. at A-4 and Exhibit A-6.
152. Oil Express, March 5, 1990 at 5.
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$90,000 for the consultant report and $60,000 for soil tests, but
his final cost for actual clean-up work was $35,000.1'
This degree of uncertainty and risk of huge financial loss
that can arise from a petroleum release are precisely the rea-
sons why private insurance companies either refuse to provide
pollution liability insurance for underground tanks or charge a
high premium for coverage. Knowledge of UST risk factors
and an awareness of the characteristics of the Washington
state USTs do not necessarily permit a reasonably accurate
prediction of the costs of a state program. Even if the state
could use UST data to accurately forecast the frequency and
severity of petroleum releases, the state must still consider sev-
eral other factors. First, the number and characteristics of
tanks in use is continually changing. Second, the number of
owners and operators who would take advantage of a state pro-
gram is uncertain. Finally, people have differing opinions as to
the application of UST characteristics as predictors of petro-
leum releases. In short, the best forecast of the loss costs of a
financial responsibility program amounts to an educated guess.
4. Administrative Expenses
The uncertain costs of administering a financial responsi-
bility assurance program compound the difficulty of predicting
expected losses. Compensation to third parties and cleanup
contractors may constitute only 50 to 65 percent of the overall
costs on a particular insurance claim." Administrative and
loss adjustment expenses are major elements of insurance
costs. Up to 25 percent of each dollar collected to provide ben-
efits can be allocated to expenses. 55 Program expenses will
depend upon the method used to market program coverage,
the method used to underwrite each application for coverage,
and the method used to settle claims and defend the owners
and operators against lawsuits. 56
153. Id.
154. See Institute of Public Law, Univ. of New Mexico, "Insuring Underground
Storage Tanks: State-Sponsored Insurance Programs A Program Development
Handbook," prepared for Region VI of the EPA (EPA Assistance I.D. No. X-006432-01-
0), January 1989 [hereinafter UNM Handbook]. An insurer of underground tanks
estimated administrative expenses of 10-15 percent exclusive of agent and broker
commissions and claims handling expenses. Id. at 4-5.
155. Tilinghast Report, supra note 144, at 9.
156. UNM Handbook, supra note 154, at 4-5. "A program's actual expenses as a
percentage of premium will vary depending on the size of the program, its complexity
and whether services are contracted out or performed by staff or agency employees."
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Any assurance program will incur routine administrative
expenses. Agents and brokers who sell program coverage and
assist in the application process must be paid a commission.
Underwriters must be paid to review applications and set indi-
vidual policy premiums. Actuaries must be paid to review
claim reserves and coverage rates. Claims adjustors must be
paid to investigate and settle claims. Accountants must be paid
to manage funds collected and invested. Environmental con-
sultants must be paid to analyze loss claims and negotiate with
environmental regulators. Attorneys must be paid to defend
against lawsuits and represent the insured in administrative
proceedings. Finally, clerical staff must be paid to handle the
blizzard of paper generated by typical insurance operations.
Beyond these routine expenses, insurance companies con-
front the possibility that someone within the organization will
make a mistake or that management will resist a claim that
results in a lawsuit against the company by the insured for
breach of contract or bad faith.'57 Whether or not the insurer
wins such a suit, the insurer must spend money to defend
itself. If the insurer loses such a lawsuit, the insurer can be
held liable for amounts in excess of the policy limits."5
For example, the risk of legal action against the state for
breach of duty owed to an owner/operator is greater where the
state has contracted directly with an owner or operator and
must fight against another state agency, such as the Depart-
ment of Ecology. 159 If the owner/operator faces liability for
Id. The Handbook includes a table of potential administrative expenses. Id. at 4-4. See
also EPA Office of Underground Storage Tanks, "Financial Assurance Programs: A
Handbook for States," at 4-3 (1988) [hereinafter EPA Handbook].
157. See Escalante v. Sentry Insurance, 49 Wash. App. 375, 743 P.2d 832 (1987);
Safeco Insurance Company of America v. JMG Restaurants Inc., 37 Wash. App. 1, 680
P.2d 409 (1984); Tank v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 105 Wash. 2d 381, 715
P.2d 1133 (1986).
158. See Tyler v. Grange Insurance Association, 3 Wash. App. 167, 473 P.2d 193
(1970).
159. Whether a state can be held liable for failure to perform a duty depends upon
program design. The liability risk is greatest when the state enters into a contractual
relationship with owners or operators. In Washington, a person seeking a tort
recovery from a government entity must, in part, overcome the "public duty" doctrine,
which requires a showing that government owed a duty to the person individually
rather than to the public in general. J & B Dev. Co. v. King County, 100 Wash. 2d 299,
699 P.2d 468 (1983). However, the "public duty" doctrine does not apply when the
government acts in a proprietary capacity. Hoffer v. State, 110 Wash. 2d 415, 755 P.2d
781 (1988). "A government acts in a proprietary capacity 'when it engages in a
business-like venture as contrasted with a governmental function.'" Id. at 422, 755
P.2d at 786.
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clean-up costs in excess of coverage limits, the owner/operator
could argue that the state program had an inherent conflict of
interest in negotiating with the Department of Ecology. The
owner/operator could successfully require the state to pay in
excess of coverage limits if the owner/operator could show that
this conflict caused a greater liability for clean-up costs.'"
Political and social pressure for clean-up of polluted sites
would contribute to an insurance program's efforts to pay
losses with more regard for public satisfaction than owner/
operator or program exposure to financial loss. 16 '
C. Providing Financial Responsibility Coverage
Many states have created or are in the process of creating
financial responsibility assurance programs. 162 These state
assurance programs approach the problem of providing finan-
cial responsibility assurance in different ways. Many options
exist; but no one option completely meets the objectives of
both the state and UST owners/operators. 163
Any state financial responsibility assurance program that
covers existing losses faces substantially higher program costs
than a program that covers only prospective losses.' In
Washington, program coverage of existing petroleum releases
would conflict with the voter approved Model Toxics Act 165
160. See Tyler v. Grange Ins. Ass'n, 3 Wash. App. 167, 473 P.2d 193 (1970).
161. Of course, the public participation requirements of the state Model Toxics
Act and implementing regulations may cause this same result of anxiety driven
cleanup action. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105D.030(2)(a) (1989). Furthermore, public
perception of the health risks associated with a release can result in compensation for
this anxiety or general malaise and additional costs for ongoing monitoring of public
health risks. Katzman, supra note 92, at 84.
162. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 376.3072 (1990); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-11-301-321
(1989); OR- REv. STAT. § 466.795 (1990); VA. CODE ANN., §§ 62.1-44 & 34:10-12 (1990).
163. For a discussion of various state program options see EPA Handbook, supra
note 156.
164. Memorandum from Bill Bafus, Senate Fiscal Analyst, to Members of the
Joint Select Committee on Underground Storage Tanks, (July 18, 1990) (discussing the
financial implications of the risk retention pool legislation, SB 6741, that the
legislature had rejected in forming the Joint Committee).
See also UNM Handbook, supra note 154, at 3-8.
If the primary goal [of a state program] is to clean up problem sites, a
guarantee or cleanup fund supported by sufficient public funds to perform
this expensive task would be an appropriate mechanism. If the program's
purpose is to offer tank owners and operators a means of demonstrating
financial responsibility with minimal state support, a state sponsored
insurance program ... will meet the state's needs.
Id.
165. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105D (1989).
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that created a cleanup fund for hazardous waste sites including
underground tank sites where a petroleum release has
occurred.1
The cleanup fund established by the Model Toxics Act
provides limited public funding to assist potentially liable per-
sons, but only after a finding that public funding would achieve
both "(A) a substantially more expeditious or enhanced
cleanup than would otherwise occur, and (B) the prevention or
mitigation of unfair economic hardship.' 1 67 A parallel state
assurance program covering existing petroleum releases would
render these conditions for obtaining state cleanup funds
meaningless because such a program would provide a duplicate
source of recovery. Careful program design also requires con-
formance with other state statutes such as the Administrative
Procedures Act, 168 Insurance Code,16 9 state/private contracting
procedures, 70 and accounting rules.'7 '
Apart from statutory conflicts with program design, state
programs must contend with state constitutional constraints on
program design.1 72 A Washington state program could face a
state constitutional challenge on the basis that the program
directly benefits owners and operators in such a manner that
appears to constitute a lending of state credit or gift of public
funds to individuals or companies. 17  Therefore, to be some-
166. WASH. REV. CODE chapter 70.105D; Attorney General Opinion No. 25, Oct. 31,
1988. In comparing legislation creating a risk retention pool to cover both past and
future cleanup of releases from underground storage tanks, the Attorney General
concluded that such a pool would constitute an amendment to the voter-approved
Initiative 97 (RCW 70.105D) requiring a two-thirds vote for implemention. Id. at 10-11.
Legislators face political risks in amending a voter-approved initiative shortly after it
has been adopted, especially when the voters simultaneously rejected a Legislative
version of the initiative as was the case in adoption of Initiative 97. Ultimately, the
Committee's recommended financial assurance plan was adopted unanimously,
thereby avoiding any potential challenge based upon an insufficient vote count. See
infra text accompanying notes 189-190.
167. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105D.070 (2)(d)(xi) (1989).
168. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05 (1989).
169. WASH. REV. CODE § Title 48 (1989).
170. WASH. REv. CODE § Title 39 (1989).
171. UNM Handbook, supra note 154, at 3-14 & 3-15.
172. Ild, at 3-12 & 3-13. These constraints include constitutional prohibitions on
the guaranteeing of private debt, extending state credit or aid to private individuals,
giving state funds to persons or businesses not controlled by the state, limitations on
state indebtedness, and restrictions on the use of specific revenue sources. Id.
173. WASH. CONST. art. VIII § 5 provides: 'The credit of the state shall not, in any
manner be given or loaned to, or in aid of, any individual, association, company or
corporation." This provision has been interpreted to include the prohibition found in
WASH. CONST. art. VIII § 7 which provides: "No county, city, town, or other municipal
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what insulated from constitutional challenge, a Washington
state insurance program would have to "sell" financial respon-
sibility assurance rather than collect taxes and "give" assur-
ance. 174 No amount of constitutional analysis and legislative
proclamation will immunize a program from constitutional
attack; rather, program design must accommodate constitu-
tional restrictions while preserving program goals.'75
Perhaps the most important technical issue pertains to
limits on a state's liability for petroleum releases and adequate
funding for these circumscribed liabilities. 7 6 No state program
should be allowed to assume owner or operator liabilities with-
out strict monetary limits and coverage definitions. 77 At a
organization shall hereafter give any money... in aid of any individual ... except for
the necessary support of the poor and infirm.. ." Johnson v. Johnson, 96 Wash. 2d
255, 261, 634 P.2d 877, 880 (1981). See Spitzer, An Analytical View of Recent 'Lending
of Credit'Decisions in Washington State, 8 UNIv. PUGET SouND L. REv. 195, 195-219
(1985).
174. The theory behind "selling" financial responsibility coverage rather than
"giving" coverage to owners and operators rests upon an assumption that the program
will meet constitutional requirements if adequate consideration has been given for the
state benefit; this consideration can be below actual benefit costs. See Scott Paper Co.
v. City of Anacortes, 90 Wash. 2d 19, 32-33, 578 P.2d 1292, 1300 (1978) (sale of water by
the City of Anacortes at less than actual cost was not a gift). Arguably, a state
financial responsibility assurance program obtains adequate consideration through the
purpose and use of funds expended- the cleanup of pollution caused by a release of
petroleum products and protection of ground water supplies through the program's
expeditious intervention to mitigate pollution damage. "Where the public receives
sufficient consideration, and benefit to an individual is only incidental to and in aid of
the public benefit, no unconstitutional gift has occurred." Tacoma v. Taxpayers of City
of Tacoma, 108 Wash. 2d 679, 705, 743 P.2d 793, 806 (1987).
175. As the Washington Supreme Court noted in the Tacoma v. Taxpayers case,
the legislature's responsibility does not include determining the constitutionality of
legislation, rather the legislature should focus on the purpose, strategy, and result of
its legislation. Tacoma v. Taxpayers, 108 Wash. 2d at 688, 743 P.2d at 798. See also
Memorandum from C. Gavigan to Members of the House Committee on Housing (July
28, 1988) (regarding lending of credit). As Gavigan notes in his advice to the
committee regarding housing finance programs:
The uncertainty that exists in lending of credit cases may make spending too
much time on lending of credit questions by the Legislature
counterproductive. Legislation that is well thought out, helps a major section
of the public with a significant need or problem, and does not contain factors
that would have concerned the framers of the constitution will likely be
upheld as constitutional by the court.
Id. at 7.
176. UNM Handbook, supra note 154, pp. 3-10 - 3-11.
177. Id. at 7. See Anderson, "Financial Responsibility for Underground Storage
Tanks," 12 The Risk Report 1 (1989). "Many of the [state financial responsibility]
funds are severely undercapitalized, with no consideration being given to potential
liabilities in the decision of funding levels. Most do not impose annual aggregate
limitation." See also Anderson, State UST Financial Assurance Funds: Disasters
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minimum, these limits and definitions are necessary to predict
program costs and budget accordingly. Funding for these costs
must be both sufficient and flexible. 178 As one commentator
has noted, "[i]ronically, although these funds are established as
programs to improve states' environmental conditions, inability
to cover claims under these programs can lead to delayed
cleanups and increased hazards to the environment and public
health." 79
One of the purposes for requiring financial responsibility
assurance from UST owners/operators is to enhance "protec-
tion of public health and the environment by increasing the
incentive for tank upgrading and replacement" through the
demands made by providers of assurance.1s A program that
financially rewards owners/operators who improve their tanks
and employ sound risk management practices reduces the need
for regulatory intervention and enforcement.
In contrast, a program that provides benefits without
regard to risk creates disincentives for early compliance with
regulatory standards that decrease the risk of loss.' 8 ' As one
commentator has noted, "[i]nsurers establish underwriting cri-
teria and premium structures that will eliminate marginal
risks and encourage loss prevention, but some state funds that
cover all tanks for the same fee eliminate incentives for tank
owners and operators to upgrade their systems."'" 2 To incorpo-
rate insurance industry practice, a state program should condi-
tion eligibility for participation upon sound risk management
Waiting to Happen, 1 ENvTL. CLAIMs J. 313, 313-321 (1989) [hereinafter Anderson,
State Funds].
178. Some states use tax revenue "ceilings" and "floors" designed to keep program
funding within a predetermined range. A tax is imposed until the revenue collected
reaches the "ceiling" amount, at which time the tax is discontinued. When the
program fund balance falls below the "floor" amount, the tax is reactivated until the
"ceiling" is again reached. EPA Handbook, supra note 156, at 4-1. Most state revenue
limitations, including ceilings and floors, result in critically underfunded programs and
initial funding levels, however financed, are inadequate. Anderson, State Funds, supra
note 177, at 318. See also UNM Handbook, supra note 154.
179. Anderson, State Funds, supra note 177, at 319.
180. 53 Fed. Reg. at 43,363.
181. 53 Fed. Reg. at 43,324. As the EPA noted in announcing financial
responsibility regulations:
Because the providers of financial assurance mechanisms may require UST
owners and operators to install leak detection and corrosion protection
systems as a condition of coverage, the financial responsibility requirements
may accelerate compliance with the technical standards.
Id.
182. Anderson, State Funds, supra note 177, at 319.
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and require owner or operator contribution to program fund-
ing reflective of the owner or operator's risk.
Another incongruity of state assurance programs is that
many of these programs completely displace or eliminate the
possibility of a private insurance market while proclaiming the
need for state action because of the limited private insurance
market." s As the EPA warns, "[i]f few insurers are currently
willing to offer UST insurance, your State could provide finan-
cial assurance in the short-run. In the long-run, however, this
short-term solution may preclude insurers from ever offering
coverage in the State, thus perpetuating the problem.""'
Thus, a state program providing complete coverage without the
involvement of the private market would create a state cover-
age monopoly, and would prolong any transition from state to
private provision of financial responsibility assurance.
On the other hand, strict voluntary participation by own-
ers/operators without below market financial incentives to
participation would result in state coverage of only the worst
risks. Insurance underwriting standards and prices that are
attractive to high risks and unattractive to low risks result in
adverse selection. Good risks are accepted by the private mar-
ket while poor risks have no other alternative but a state
assurance program. The consequence of this adverse selection
is that the state program experiences higher than average
losses without the premium income from good risks to fund
these losses. Eventually, prices must climb to reflect large
losses, forcing another round of departure of risks which can
obtain a better price elsewhere.
Thus, a state program must obtain good risks by offering
prices competitive with the private market in order to main-
tain stable prices and losses. Predictability and stability of pro-
gram costs requires a broad crossection of risks, and sufficient
numbers of owners/operators.8 5 Therefore, a state should
involve private insurers, include both good and bad risks, and
strive to transfer the state's role to the private sector.
If private insurers express concern over the risks associ-
ated with insuring USTs and over their inability to adequately
manage pollution claims, a state contemplating the creation of
183. EPA Handbook, supra note 156, at 2-2. See also Anderson, State Funds, supra
note 177, at 320.
184. EPA Handbook, supra note 156, at 2-2.
185. D'Arcy & Herricks, supra note 88, at 74-75.
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an assurance program should be extremely cautious. Given the
complexities of underwriting and managing underground stor-
age tank risks, no state possesses the inherent ability to
assume these responsibilities. Other states' existing assurance
programs employ "no clear mechanisms for controlling losses
and claims costs, and attention to administrative costs and
needs appears to be woefully lacking.""' Program mismanage-
ment and failure hurts the groups intended to benefit from any
program and results in political, as well as social disaster." 7
Similarly, many of the owners and operators do not have
the technical capabilities or money to respond to corrective
action requirements. Thus, a program that provides reim-
bursement rather than direct and immediate assistance could
financially drain owners and operators and could delay effec-
tive corrective action before owners/operators obtained pro-
gram benefits. More importantly, state involvement and
assistance at the first sign of petroleum release is necessary to
limit liability, control expenditures, and mitigate damage."
III. THE WASHINGTON POLLUTION LIABILITY INSURANCE
PROGRAM
In 1989, the legislature adopted the Joint Committee's rec-
ommendation to create a pollution liability reinsurance pro-
gram.18 9  However, the legislature prohibited full
186. Anderson, State Funds, suprm note 177, at 318.
187. "A damning appraisal of the Florida amnesty and insurance programs is
contained in the committee report which accompanied the bill enacting the insurance
program . .." Memorandum from LeBouef, Lam, Leiby & MacRae to the NAIC
Environmental Liability Insurance Task Force Advisory Committee at 4 (October 28,
1988) (reviewing options for state intervention to provide UST coverage). The
memorandum highlights the large deficits and lack of state cleanup action on
thousands of reported claims. However, the memorandum primarily faults lack of
adequate funding for these problems. Id. at 5.
188. Gulledge, supra note 93, at 447 (1989). Gulledge advises:
Rapid response to an environmental contamination incident is critical in order
to operate a successful [pollution] insurance program. The longer the
response time, the more severe the incident can become. A multidisciplinary
team that is available 24 hours a day is necessary for [pollution] claims
management. A network of professionals should be established, and they
would be available for rapid cleanups and have the technical expertise to
evaluate the extent of the contamination. They would provide legal assistance
and insurance claims adjustment expertise. This pro-active claims approach
... [is] the foundation for understanding and insuring potential environmental
exposures.
Id. at 448-449.
189. 1989 Wash. Laws, ch. 383.
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implementation of the program and expenditure of program
funds until further review and approval of the program during
the 1990 legislative session.19 Before the legislature would
authorize full program implementation, the legislature wanted
a report analyzing its costs and effectiveness. 19'
On January 1, 1990, the administrator of the newly formed
Pollution Liability Reinsurance Program delivered his report
to the legislature. 9 2 In part, the report was based upon
research and advice provided by consulting firms under con-
tract to the agency.' 93 Based upon recommendations contained
in the report and after further review of program objectives,
the legislature amended the governing statute and authorized
full implementation of the program."
The state program's fundamental objective is to guarantee
the availability and affordability of pollution liability insurance
for owners/operators of underground storage tanks' 5 The
state proposes to meet the objective of affordability by selling
reinsurance to a pollution liability insurance company at a
price well below the private market price for similar reinsur-
ance. The insurer is required to pass this discount on to own-
ers/operators of underground storage tanks who meet
underwriting standards established by the program director.'
1
190. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.148.100 (1990).
191. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.148.100(1) 'The administrator shall report to the
legislature by January 1, 1990, on the estimated costs to the insured and the state of
implementing the program including proposed coverage, rates, and underwriting the
insurer recommended by the administrator." Id.
192. Jim Sims, Administrator's Report to the Legislature, Pollution Liability
Reinsurance Program (Jan. 1, 1990).
193. Warren, McVeigh & Griffin, Inc., State of Washington Pollution Liability
Reinsurance Agency with the assistance of Milliman and Robertson, Inc. for actuarial
services, and Applied Geotechnology for technical environmental information (Nov. 16,
1989).
194. 1990 Washington Laws ch. 64 §§ 1-14.
195. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.148.005(2)(d)(1989).
196. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.148.005(2) provides in part:
[Tihis chapter establishes a program to provide pollution liability reinsurance
at a price that will encourage a private insurance company or risk retention
group to sell pollution liability insurance in accordance with the requirements
of this chapter to owners and operators of underground petroleum storage
tanks, thereby allowing owners and operators to comply with the financial
responsibility regulations of the EPA.
Reinsurance is insurance issued to an insurance company that allows the insurance
company to pass a part of its risk to the reinsurer. In its simplest form, reinsurance is
a method of spreading the financial burdens assumed by an insurance company when
it issues policies to individuals, businesses and other entities. See generally, REINsuR-
ANCE (R. Strain ed. 1980) [hereinafter REINSURANCE].
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The state proposes to meet the object of availability by requir-
ing the insurer to accept a greater degree of risk than the
insurer would otherwise accept without state involvement.
Therefore, the success or failure of the program rests upon the
state's ability to convince a private insurer to enter a reinsur-
ance contract with the State of Washington.
The legislature chose the reinsurance program over com-
peting alternatives for several reasons. First, a reinsurance
program will minimize state participation in investigating and
settling pollution liability claims. Second, the reinsurance pro-
gram will minimize state exposure to liability for pollution
claims. Finally, the reinsurance program will encourage pri-
vate insurance company participation to allow the state to
eventually discontinue the program."
However, the program must accomplish these goals in a
manner that "[plarallels generally accepted principles of insur-
ance and risk management."' 9 The legislature warned that
[i]t is not the intent of this [program] to permit owners and
operators... to obtain pollution liability insurance without
regard to the quality or condition of their storage tanks or
without regard to the risk management practices of the tank
owners and operators nor is it the intent of this [program] to
provide coverage or funding for past or existing petroleum
releases.199
The program can deviate from standard insurance industry
practices "only to the extent necessary and within the tax rev-
enue limits provided to make ... insurance reasonably afforda-
ble and available to owners and operators who meet [program
requirements]."'  In particular, the program must help those
owners/operators whose USTs meet a vital economic need
within the affected community.2°1
Clearly, the legislature wanted to avoid both program mis-
management and runaway program costs. As if the intent
statements were not enough, the legislature buttressed its con-
cerns by requiring the program director to contract with
experts as necessary and to report to the legislature before
197. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 70.148.005(2) (3).
198. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.148.005(2)(d).
199. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.148.005(3).
200. Id.
201. WAH. REV. CODE § 70.148.005.
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entering into any reinsurance contract. 2 As a last resort, the
legislature created an escape hatch from the program:
[t]he legislature reserves the right to amend or repeal all or
any part of this [program] at any time, and there is no vested
right of any kind against such amendment or repeal. All the
rights, privileges, or immunities conferred by this chapter or
any acts done under it exist subject to the power of the legis-
lature to amend or repeal [the program] at any time.2 °3
In essence, the legislature told program management,
'here is our investment in the reinsurance company that you
must create and manage in a business-like manner. If you do
not perform in accordance with our wishes, we will liquidate
the company.' To owners and operators, the legislature effec-
tively said, 'the program will do its best to keep you in business
by providing insurance; however, not all of you will be saved
and none of you have legal rights against us if the program
fails.' To the insurance industry, the legislature said, 'this pro-
gram presents you with an opportunity for state assistance in
creating and maintaining a pollution insurance market; how-
ever, we guarantee nothing, and expect favors in return.'
Mindful of the risks involved, the legislature devised an
experiment to determine whether the state could invent an
insurance market by acting as an entrepreneur without a profit
motive. The legislature gave the program as many tools as pos-
sible to succeed as a business venture. It is administered
through a newly created, independent state agency and its
director has broad authority to design the program.' ° The
enabling legislation specified no deductibles, coverage prices,
reinsurance contract terms, underwriting standards, or cover-
202. 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 64 § 4(2) provides in part:
[t]o the extent necessary to protect the state from unintended liability and
ensure quality program and contract design, the director shall contract with
an organization or organizations with demonstrated experience and ability in
managing and designing pollution liability insurance and with an organization
or organizations with demonstrated experience and ability in managing and
designing pollution liability reinsurance.
1990 Wash. Laws ch. 64 § 6(1) provides in part:
[blefore initially entering into a reinsurance contract, the director shall pro-
vide a report to the chairs of the senate ways and means, senate financial
institutions, house of representatives revenue, and house of representatives
financial institutions committees and shall include an actuarial report describ-
ing the various reinsurance methods considered by the director and describing
each method's costs.
203. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.148.110.
204. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.148.030.
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age limitations because these aspects of the program will be
subject to negotiation with an insurer." 5 Instead, the legisla-
ture provided a simple plan of operation that requires the
director to use sound business judgment in determining these
insurance and reinsurance variables. 206
As a last measure of freedom, the legislative exempted the
program and its participating insurer from public disclosure
laws to protect sensitive information.' The program and the
participating insurer are exempt from most provisions of the
state insurance code; however, the program and the participat-
ing insurer are subject to state insurance statutes governing
Insurance Commissioner examination of insurers; statutes per-
taining to insurance company annual reports, assets, liabilities,
and investments; statutes prohibiting unfair and deceptive acts
and practices; and statutes governing risk retention groups.m
To balance this broad exemption, the program and its partici-
pating insurer are not covered by the state insurance guaranty
fund which covers insurer liabilities in the event of company
insolvency.20 9
The insurer contracting with the state will charge owners
and operators a premium to meet the insurer's obligations. To
fund reinsurance program obligations, a petroleum products
tax of 0.50 percent is levied on the wholesale value of any
petroleum product upon first possession in the state.210 Petro-
leum products exported for use or sale as fuel outside of the
state, as well as petroleum products packaged for sale to ulti-
mate consumers, are exempt from taxation.
Proceeds from the tax are deposited into the pollution lia-
bility reinsurance program trust account to fund the reinsur-
ance program. Collection of this tax must cease whenever the
account balance exceeds $15 million and collection may resume
when the balance drops below $7.5 million.21' However, in
determining whether the account balance exceeds $15 million,
205. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.148.070.
206. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.148.050.
207. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.148.060(1). "All examination and proprietary reports
and information obtained by the administrator... in soliciting bids from insurers and
in monitoring the insurer. .. shall not be made public or otherwise disclosed to any
person, firm, corporation, agency, association, governmental body, or other entity." Id.
208. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.148.090.
209. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.148.090(2).
210. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.23A (1989).
211. 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 64, § 12(4).
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surplus and loss reserves may not be counted. 2 Four times a
year, the director must establish the necessary reserve
amounts and report these to the legislature, the Insurance
Commissioner, and the Department of Revenue.213 Thus, reve-
nue collections are determined by the capital needs and loss
experience of the program limited only by the tax rate itself.
The extraordinary grant of power to the program director
by the legislature was both necessary and desirable. Unlike
most other government programs, no blueprint exists to build
a state owned reinsurance company. Until recently, no sepa-
rate, clearly defined insurance coverage existed for corrective
action of UST releases. Market development of this insurance
product proceeded from the statutory mandate that UST
owner/operators obtain such coverage. Therefore, the state
must concentrate upon goals and results. The state cannot suc-
ceed in this new venture by statutorily predetermining all
aspects of program structure and insurance coverage before
negotiation and development has occurred in partnership with
the insurance company that will risk its capital.
However, while the legislature granted the program a
broad berth, the legislature also imposed some constraints on
the program. The program cannot provide coverage in excess
of $1 million per occurrence and $2 million annual aggre-
gate.214 While coverage cannot include losses occurring prior
to the inception date of coverage under the program, polluted
sites are eligible for coverage subject to the following
conditions:
(a) The owner or operator must have a plan for proceeding
with corrective action; and
(b) If the owner or operator files a claim with the insurer,
the owner or operator has the burden of proving that the
212. 1& "'Loss reserve' means the amount traditionally set aside by commercial
liability insurers for costs and expenses related to claims that have been made. 'Loss
reserve' does not include losses that have been incurred but not reported to the
insurer." Id, § 2(9) (to be codified at Wash. Rev. Code § 70.148.010(9)). "'Surplus
reserve' means the amount traditionally set aside by commercial property and casualty
insurance companies to provide financial protection from unexpected losses and to
serve, in part, as a measure of an insurance company's net worth." Id., § 2(17) (to be
codified at Wash. Rev Code § 70.148.010(17)).
213. 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 64, § 3(2). The program established a surplus reserve of
$8 million on April 10, 1990. Pollution Liability Insurance Agency, "Request for
Proposal," at 7 (Apr. 30, 1990). Revenue collections from the period beginning July
1989 to January 1990, totaled approximately $9.6 million exclusive of interest income.
Id. at 4.
214. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.148.050(1)(c).
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claim is not related to a preexisting release until the owner
or operator demonstrates to the satisfaction of the director
that corrective action has been completed.2
15
The program director may use program funds to subsidize
the costs incurred by an owner or operator for the tank or site
analysis which is required by an insurer as part of the process
for determining whether to issue a policy to the owner or oper-
ator.216 An owner or operator may appeal the insurer's deci-
sion to reject an application for coverage or cancel an existing
policy to the program director.217 The director must compel
the insurance company contracting with the state to condition
issuance of an insurance policy upon the owner/operator's
compliance with laws governing USTs,21 s and upon the owner/
operator's exercise of prudent risk management practices.219
Finally, the insurer must cover the owner/operator's costs in
defending against liability,' must use a variable premium rate
structure based upon tank and other characteristics, and must
impose a coverage deductible upon owner/operators. 221
The legislature placed additional restraints on the pro-
gram. First, any reinsurance contract between the program
and an insurer must include a provision to arbitrate disputes
between the state and the insurer.222 Additionally, the con-
tract must contain a clause disclaiming liability for the
insurer's portion of policy coverage in the event of the
insurer's insolvency.2' However, the legislature allowed the
215. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.148.070(5).
216. 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 64, § 11 provides:
The director may design the program to cover the costs incurred in
determining whether a proposed applicant for pollution insurance under the
program meets the underwriting standards of the insurer. In covering such
costs the director shall consider the financial resources of the applicant, shall
take into consideration the economic impact of the discontinued use of the
applicant's storage tank upon the affected community, shall provide coverage
within the revenue limits provided under this chapter, and shall limit
coverage of such costs to the extent that coverage would be detrimental to
providing affordable insurance under the program.
217. WASH. REv. CODE § 70.148.080 (1989).
218. WAH. REV. CODE § 70.148.050(5) (1989).
219. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.148.050(5) & 70.148.070(2)(d).
220. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.148.070(2)(a).
221. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.148.070(2).
222. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.148.050(1)(d).
223. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.148.050. This statutory provision is intended to protect
the program from "drop-down" liability common in reinsurance disputes involving
insolvent primary insurers. Policyholders will often attempt to force the reinsurance
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director to recommend methods for providing program
benefits. 24
The program director reviewed two methods for providing
program benefits in his January 1990 report to the legisla-
ture-traditional excess of loss reinsurance and "gap" reinsur-
ance. 2  "Excess of loss" reinsurance provides an insurance
company with a contract by which the state agrees to reim-
burse a company for claim payments and other costs that
exceed an agreed upon amount.226 In other words, the state
will sell an insurance policy to an insurance company and will
pay claims exceeding the insurance company's deductible
(retention).
In contrast to "excess of loss" reinsurance, "gap" reinsur-
ance reverses the positions of the insurer and reinsurer in the
reinsurance agreement.227 Ordinarily, the so-called "gap" rein-
surance would be viewed simply as the agency providing the
primary coverage to the policyholder with the insurance com-
pany acting as excess insurer. However, under the proposal
discussed in the director's report, the insurance company
would be the only party contracting with an owner or operator;
the director's report proposes that the insurance company seek
reimbursement from the agency for coverage expenditures
falling between the policyholder deductible and the insurer's
coverage responsibility. 228 Of the two methods discussed in the
legislative report, the director recommended the traditional
"excess of loss" reinsurance method.' Nevertheless, the legis-
company providing excess insurance (coverage that exceeds the amount of liability
retained by the reinsured insurance company) to "drop-down" and cover the insolvent
primary insurer's portion of liability. For example, if an owner insured under the
state program suffers a $250,000 loss and the insurer that is reinsured by the state was
responsible for the first $100,000 of any policyholder loss but becomes insolvent, the
owner could attempt to force the state to provide the insurance company's portion of
the loss. See generally Lanzone & Burke, The Drop-Down Liability ofExcess Insurers,
THE BRIEF (A.B.A. SEC. TORT AND INS. PRAC.) (1989) at 36-40 & 48-55. See also
REINSURANCE, supra note 196, at 90-92.
224. 1989 Wash. Laws ch. 383 § 6(1). As originally adopted, the program could
consider only "excess of loss" reinsurance. 1989 Wash. Laws ch. 383, § 6(1). For a
discussion of excess of loss reinsurance, see REINSURANCE, supra note 196, at 213-251.
This restriction on the form of reinsurance allowed under the program was repealed
when the Legislature revised the program in 1990. 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 64, § 2(6).
225. Pollution Liability Reinsurance Agency, Report to the Legislature, 42 (Jan. 1,
1990) at 22-27 [hereinafter Report to the Legislature].
226. See REINSURANCE, supra note 196, at 213-251.
227. Report to the Legislature, supra note 225, at 23.
228. Id. at 26.
229. Id. at 27. "This alternative would result in favorable premiums and would
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lature permitted the director to consider any method of provid-
ing coverage. 230
The legislature also provided for both program oversight
and expertise through a variety of reporting and consulting
requirements. First, the Governor must appoint a standing
technical advisory committee to the program.23 This commit-
tee is to be comprised of representatives of "the public, the
petroleum marketing industry, business and local government
owners of USTs, and insurance professionals. '"122 Second, the
director must consult with the Department of Ecology in
developing and adopting regulations governing insurance cov-
erage exclusions affecting corrective action coverage under the
program.233 Third, the director must also prepare an annual
report to the legislature analyzing the financial viability of
both the program and the insurer covered by the program. 
2 -
Fourth, the director must continually evaluate the success of
the program and its effects on private insurance market devel-
opment,235 and make recommendations to the legislature
regarding the need for its continuance.236
IV. PROGRAM SUCCESS
Because the state program cannot directly insure owners
and operators, its success rests upon the director's ability to
contract with a pollution liability insurance company.237 Pro-
gram success also rests upon the number of owners and opera-
tors who are able to obtain affordable insurance and hence
remain in business. A contract with an insurance company has
no value unless a majority of tank owners and operators are
covered under the contract.
Program success requires a delicate balancing of state and
private interests. The program director cannot ignore the
political reality that the reinsurance program was created by
minimize state involvement in reimbursing the insurer for losses .... T]he
involvement of the state in reimbursement for the settlement of virtually every claim
would require even more extensive auditing responsibilities. It would also result in
potentially extensive obligations against the [agency's] Trust account." Id.
230. See 1990 Wash. Laws clL 64 § 2.
231. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.148.030(3).
232. Id.
233. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.148.070(3).
234. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.148.050(7).
235. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.148.050(8).
236. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.148.050(6).
237. See supra text accompanying notes 189-197.
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the legislature in response to pleas by owners and operators
who predicted dire social and economic consequences without
state financial responsibility assistance.2" Nor can the director
ignore the legislature's fear of program deficits and potential
state liability.23 9 Therefore, the director must utilize program
features to creatively blend competing private and public inter-
ests to meet program objectives.
The program offers insurance companies many incentives
to contract with the state including direct and indirect finan-
cial incentives. The most direct financial incentive is the offer
of reinsurance at a substantial market discount. Normally, an
insurer can expect to pay a percentage of each premium dollar
collected to the reinsurer depending upon the type and amount
of reinsurance. 4  Under the program, state tax revenues pro-
vide a steady stream of income to the program as a substitute
for investment capital and premium payments. Therefore, the
program can afford to charge the insurer a nominal reinsur-
ance premium241 and the insurer can retain owner/operator
premium dollars that would normally pass to the reinsurer.
The insurer not only saves on the cost of reinsurance but
retains the investment income earned on owner/operator pre-
mium payments.242
238. Letter from Gary L. Smith, Executive Director, Independent Business
Association to Mike Kreider and Roy Ferguson, Co-Chairs, Joint Select Committee on
Storage Tanks (Nov. 28, 1988) (predicting failure of small businesses unless
Washington legislature passes state UST reinsurance program) (copy on file with
University of Puget Sound Law Review).
239. See supra text accompanying notes 195-203.
240. REINSURANCE, supra note 196, at 213.
241. Report to Legislature, supra note 225, at 38. The program director has
recommended setting the reinsurance rate in an amount necessary to cover the
program's administration costs. Id.
242. An issue that must be addressed by the insurer and the program is
responsibility for unearned premium reserves. When an insurer receives payment for
a policy, the premium collected is not fully earned until the end of the policy period.
State insurance codes require insurers to set aside unearned premiums in a reserve
account to permit a refund of premiums should the policyholder cancel before the
policy period expires. In a reinsurance transaction, the reinsurer is required to set
aside an unearned premium reserve in amount corresponding to the percentage of
premium passed to the reinsurer by the insurer. Under the state program, the insurer
will retain most of the premium collected from owners and operators while the state
will assume responsibility for the largest portion of the policy limits. Presumably, the
insurer should create and maintain a full unearned premium reserve for policyholders
despite the state's assumption of a percentage of the risk. The insurer could ask the
state to assume its appropriate share of unearned premium reserve consistent with the
role that the state has assumed by entering into a normal reinsurance transaction.
However, to accomplish this result, the insurer would have to calculate the probable
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Indirect financial incentives to attract insurer participation
in the state program include exemptions from provisions of the
Washington insurance code. For example, the insurer con-
tracting with the state program will enjoy a premium tax
exemption resulting in a savings in an amount equaling two
percent of the premiums collected for policies written through
the program.M 3 In addition, premiums received by an insurer
through participation in the program cannot be included in the
assessment base used to determine each insurer's required con-
tribution toward financing the state Insurance Commissioner's
Office.2 " Statutory and regulatory exemptions will also lower
overhead costs associated with compliance with policy form
and rate filing requirements.245
Apart from the financial benefits derived from insurance
code exemptions, insurers contracting with the state program
will enjoy unprecedented freedom to design, price, and market
insurance. Although the contracting insurer must conform to
EPA financial responsibility regulations, they may design poli-
cies without regard to any state insurance statute or regulation
governing liability policies.' In addition, the program director
"real" cost of reinsurance to serve as a guide to the state's program for maintaining an
appropriate amount of unearned premium reserve.
243. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.148.090 provides an exemption from WASH. REV. CODE
§ 48.14.020 governing premium taxes for insurers authorized to do business in
Washington and from WASH. REV. CODE § 48.15.120 governing premiums taxes for
unauthorized (surplus lines) companies issuing policies in Washington.
244. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.148.090.
245. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 48.18 (regulating insurance contracts) & 48.19
(regulating insurance rates).
246. For example, WASH. REV. CODE § 48.18.180 provides:
(1) The premium stated in the policy shall be inclusive of all fees, charges,
premiums, or other consideration charged for the insurance or for the
procurement of insurance.
(2) No insurer or its officer, employee, agent, solicitor, or other representative
shall charge or receive any fee, compensation, or consideration for insurance
which is not included in the premium specified in the policy.
Despite this statutory provision, the program can create a separate compensation sys-
tem for program marketing, underwriting and application processing. Such a compen-
sation system would allow the program to directly cover the costs related to site
analysis and testing for underwriting purposes, as contemplated under the program's
enabling legislation, through payments to insurance brokers or environmental consul-
tants rather than payments to owners or operators.
As another example, WASH. REV. CODE § 48.18.190 provides that "[n]o agreement
in conflict with, modifying, or extending any contract of insurance shall be valid unless
in writing and made a part of the policy." Despite this statutory provision, the pro-
gram can require and the insurer can issue policies made subject to program regula-
tions. Moreover, given the insurance code exemptions, no policy need be issued.
Instead, the insurer could, upon request, issue a financial responsibility certificate
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could insulate the contracting insurer from the uncertain costs
of judicial interpretation of policy provisions by adopting the
insurer's policy form as a regulation directed at the insurer.'
By requiring the insurer to issue coverage in language required
by regulation, the proper judicial inquiry in a coverage dispute
would be based upon administrative rather than insurance law
principles.24
Unlike the financial assurance programs in other states,
Washington's program strives to mimic insurance business
practices. The governing statute clearly prohibits coverage of
existing or past losses, requires prospective policyholders to
required by the EPA indicating that pollution liability coverage is governed by pro-
gram regulations. Thus, policy provisions could be quickly amended to reflect changes
in law and technology without the time and cost associated with traditional policy
changes.
247. If a policyholder and the insurance company disagree as to what a particular
policy provision means, a court will interpret the provision from the point of view of
an ordinary purchaser of insurance. Prosser Comm'n Co. v. Guaranty Nat'l Ins., 41
Wash. App. 425, 429, 700 P.2d 1188, 1190 (1985). This standard of judging in accordance
with the understanding of an average lay person is not adjusted to reflect the wit or
sophistication of the particular policyholder such as a major corporation. Boeing Co. v.
Aetna Casualty & Sur., 113 Wash. 2d 869, 882, 784 P.2d 507, 514 (1990). If a court finds
the disputed provision ambiguous, the court will interpret the provision in favor of the
policyholder and against the drafter of the contract. Kowal v. Grange Ins. Ass'n., 110
Wash. 2d 239, 247-48, 751 P.2d 306, 310 (1988). "However, there is no doubt that a
policy provision cannot contravene the mandate of the state as judicially interpreted."
Kenworthy v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins., 113 Wash. 2d 309, 315, 779 P.2d 257, 260 (1989)
(citations omitted). The contrary should also be true-if a statute requires a certain
provision, a rule of strict construction against the insurer does not apply. Inter
Insurance Exch. of Auto. Club of Southern Cal. v. Marquez, 116 Cal. App. 3d 652, 656
172 Cal. Rptr. 263, 264 (1981).
248. If the financial responsibility assurance program adopts a regulation
incorporating the insurer's policy form in its entirety and directs the insurer to provide
coverage accordingly, the insurer has not drafted the contract but rather is
administering coverage in accordance with a state law. Therefore, a dispute over the
meaning of a particular policy provision would constitute a dispute over the meaning
of a regulation. The regulation will be presumed valid and "neither the
reasonableness of the rule nor the factual basis which leads an agency to adopt a rule
is properly the concern of the court." American Network v. Washington Utils. &
Transp. Comm'n., 113 Wash. 2d 59, 71, 776 P.2d 950, 957 (1989). More importantly, the
agency's interpretation of the meaning of its own rules is given great weight by courts.
Hart v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 567, 569 (9th Cir. 1986), Washington State Liquor Control Bd.
v. Washington State Personnel Bd., 88 Wash. 2d 368, 379, 561 P.2d 195, 201 (1977).
Therefore, if an owner or operator disputed the meaning and coverage of a policy
whose content is completely governed by state regulation, then the dispute is an
administrative law question rather than an insurance law issue. This difference
requires a court to favor the state and its interpretation over the policyholder's
understanding. See Federated American Ins. v. Marquardt, 108 Wash. 2d 651, 741 P.2d
18 (1987). (Insurance Commissioner's interpretation of own rule governing required
level of auto medical benefits was entitled to great weight, court will not review the
wisdom or desirability of a rule).
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meet underwriting standards, and mandates the use of sound
actuarial principles in designing and managing the program. 49
Each of these provisions should provide some degree of com-
fort to an insurer contemplating a business relationship with
Washington. However, an insurer will most likely wait to see
how the program director implements these legislative direc-
tives. For example, if the director requires a bidding insurer to
agree to accept a class of tanks that the insurer views as
extreme risks, the bidding insurer may decide to forgo the
state reinsurance contract. Other potential disincentives to
insurer participation in the state program could affect the ben-
efits obtained by the insurer.
The greatest potential disincentive to insurer participation
in the program is the risk of a state default on its reinsurance
obligations. Reinsurance contract relationships are typically
long term and require the utmost of good faith in dealings
between the parties. 5° However, an insurer cannot have much
faith when the state plans to terminate the reinsurance pro-
gram on June 1, 1995, and the legislature has declared that "all
the rights, privileges, and immunities conferred by the [pro-
gram] or any acts done under it exist subject to the power of
the legislature to amend or repeal [the program] at any
time."'251
By this provision, then, the legislature may void the direc-
tor's act of entering into a reinsurance contract at a later
date.252 Of course, this risk may be remedied through an
249. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.148.005(d)(3) & 70.148.070(d).
250. See generally REINsURANcE, supra note 196.
251. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.148.110 (1989).
252. It is not clear how Washington courts would react to a legislative attempt to
rescind a reinsurance agreement through statutory repeal. Generally, the state is
bound to observe the same rules of contract as is required of its citizens. State v.
Clausen, 94 Wash. 166, 162 P. 1 (1917). The state is held to resolute good faith in its
contractual dealings. Eagles v. General Electric Co., 5 Wash. 2d 20, 104 P.2d 912 (1940).
"When a statute has been repealed, the rights or liabilities created by the statute fall;
however, this does not extirpate vested rights, which remain enforceable despite
repeal." Ward v. Washington State University, 39 Wash. App. 630, 632, 695 P.2d 133,
135 (1985). Nevertheless, the legislature has clearly stated that "there is no vested
right of any kind against such amendment or repeal [of the program]." WASH. REV.
CODE § 70.148.110. In Carlstrom v. State, 103 Wash. 2d 391, 694 P.2d 1 (1985), the
supreme court reviewed a statutory provision providing that written contracts
governing salary agreements with employees of community colleges would "not be
binding upon future actions of the Legislature." Id. at 398, 694 P.2d at 6. The court
found that this language was insufficient to permit the state to modify its preexisting
contracts with the community college faculty and held that the provision violated the
state and federal constitutional provisions prohibiting impairment of contracts. The
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owner/operator insurance policy provision cancelling coverage
when the state cancels reinsurance coverage. This risk of state
default may constitute sufficient consideration on the part of
the insurance company to constitutionally justify a low price
for state reinsurance, thereby avoiding state "lending of credit"
prohibitions.2 3
Apart from an intentional default, the state could uninten-
tionally default if obligations exceed revenues.' But this is a
customary business risk. The insurer can use traditional meth-
ods to determine whether the program is a sufficiently capital-
ized and reserved reinsurance 'company.'2 Moreover, an
insurer contracting with Washington will be challenged by
other states' insurance regulators to prove that Washington
state reinsurance should be counted in an analysis of insurer
reserves and liabilities.' Other states' regulating the insurer
may require that in order to count Washington reinsurance,
Washington must give the insurer some form of financial guar-
antee proving the existence of state program surplus and
reserves.2
7
The legislature's 1990 amendments to provisions regarding
program revenues should ensure the existence of sufficient
state funds because state revenue collections will reflect pro-
court stated that "the Legislature knows how to use plain English to make existing
contracts subject to future modification. It could have written [in the statute] ...
'these agreements shall be subject to subsequent modification by the Legislature."' Id.
The court nevertheless suggested that such an impairment still would be subject to
independent judicial analysis to determine whether the impairment was "reasonable
and necessary." Id. at 399, 694 P.2d at 6 (citing U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1
(1977) (describing the "reasonable and necessary" standard)). Id. at 394, 694 P.2d at 4.
The best solution to this problem is for the program director to ensure that the
reinsurance agreement conditions contract performance upon revenue sufficiency and
future legislative actions. Id. at 394, 694 P.2d at 4.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 195-203.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 203-206.
255. See REINSURANCE, supra note 196, at 599-614.
256. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 48.12.160 for standards governing insurer credit
for reinsurance. Generally, the Washington Insurance Commissioner, and other
commissioners, must be satisfied that Washington state, as a non-licensed reinsurer,
"maintains sufficient assets in the United States for the protection of policyholders in
the United States and operates its business in [a manner similar to licensed reinsurers]
and that it is able to pay losses in the United States." WASH. REV. CODE
§ 48.12.160(1)(a).
257. Id. § (1)(b)(ii) provides that an insurer may take credit for reinsurance from
a non-licensed reinsurer in an amount not exceeding- "[tihe amount of a clean and
irrevocable letter of credit issued by a bank which is a member of the federal reserve
system .... "
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gram liabilities.2-5 As the insurer issues policies to owners and
operators, the program director can expand surplus reserves to
compensate for program growth.259 As claims are made, the
director can create loss reserves for liabilities that will require
state program payments.' In addition to these reserves, the
insurer may always increase owner/operator insurance premi-
ums with the director's approval."
Another factor affecting insurer interest in providing
insurance under the Washington program is the state's
enforcement of underground storage tank technical and finan-
cial responsibility regulations. 2 Lack of promulgation and
enforcement of technical regulations by the Department of
Ecology requires the insurer to duplicate the Department's
functions by verifying that a potential policyholder has com-
plied with all appropriate environmental regulations prior to
policy issuance. Moreover, if an insurer has no faith in the
Department of Ecology's ability to enforce regulations, then
258. See 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 64, § 12; WASH. REV. CODE § 82.23A.020(4) (1990).
259. See WASH. REV. CODE § 70.148.020(2) (1989). The director determines surplus
and loss reserves quarterly. 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 64, § 3(2). Surplus reserves serve:
1) to absorb underwriting losses or operating costs beyond those envisioned in
the rate level used;
2) to absorb declines in the value of the investment portfolio;
3) to allow for adequate loss reserves, and
4) to finance future growth in written premiulns.
REINSURANCE, supra note 196, at 600.
260. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.148.020(2). Petromark's experience in providing
pollution liability coverage to underground tank owners and operators serves as a
warning of the difficulty in setting loss reserves and underscores insurer fears in
dealing with Washington state. On January 29, 1990, Petromark's actuary reported
that liability claims were underreserved by one-third. In a single quarter, despite
following actuary advice in setting loss reserves, Petromark went from a positive net
worth of $9.5 million to a negative net worth of $10.5 million. Another actuarial firm
hired by Petromark for a second opinion reported a lower figure of needed reserves.
Petromark is now undergoing voluntary rehabilitation by the State of Tennessee. See
"Petromark in Rehabilitation", National Underwriter, April 16, 1990, at 3; Petromark
Letter, supra note 24. An insurance company considering business with Washington
has no assurance that the state program will be any more capable than Petromark in
adequately projecting and funding liabilities.
261. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.148.070(2)(g) (1989).
262. "State Options for Implementing Financial Responsibility Requirements for
Petroleum Underground Storage Tanks," Report from the Environmental Liability
Insurance (D) Task Force Advisory Committee to the full Task Force (Nov. 1, 1988).
In part the committee concluded:
The ability and willingness of the EPA and state environmental regulatory
agencies to enforce new technical and financial responsibility requirements
directly impacts the availability of an insurable tank population for the tank
insurance market.
Id. at 3 (copy on file at the University of Puget Sound Law Review).
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the insurer will duplicate the Department of Ecology's func-
tions irrespective of the Department's performance of these
same functions. The resulting costs of verifying compliance
with environmental regulations will be added to the costs of
insurance. Ironically, tank owners and operators are paying
fees to the state for the Department of Ecology administration
and enforcement of UST regulations2' and may be forced to
pay the insurer to duplicate this effort.
Lack of enforcement of the financial responsibility regula-
tions limits the market for insurance. 264 Few tank owners and
operators willingly purchase pollution liability insurance.
Without sufficient numbers of prospective policyholders, the
fixed costs of an insurance operation cannot be adequately
recouped and the variable costs associated with the risks
assumed cannot be adequately predicted. Strict enforcement of
financial responsibility regulations by the program will ensure
a large market for the contracting insurer because of the price
advantages that the program insurer will enjoy over non-con-
tracting insurance competitors.
The legislature recognized the relationship between
enforcement of financial responsibility regulations and insur-
ance availability by amending the program statute to require
enforcement of these regulations when the program became
operational.265 However, on the day the Governor signed this
263. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.76.090-.100 (1989). Given an insurer's vested financial
interest in avoiding or minimizing losses, an insurer will employ whatever
underwriting and ongoing monitoring methods of USTs necessary to prevent coverage
of USTs that fail to comply with technical regulations or fail to meet certain risk
standards. Therefore, an insurer will know sooner than the Department of Ecology
whether an owner or operator complies with regulations and will give the owner or
operator the choice of compliance or cancellation of coverage. Cancellation of coverage
puts the owner or operator in violation of law and forces the owner or operator to
discontinue operations until financial responsibility assurance is obtained. Therefore,
one can logically conclude that any owner or operator who has obtained insurance has
also complied with all appropriate UST regulations.
264. N. Ashford & R. Stone, Executive Summary Presented to the Environmental
Liability Insurance Task Force (May 22, 1989). The executive summary notes:
The lack of enforcement of financial responsibility provisions, ostensibly
justified by concern about the difficulties in obtaining risk coverage, is
particularly troubling, since it represents a cause-and-effect confusion... the
market for environmental liability insurance will perish if (stringent)
financial responsibility provisions are not vigorously enforced.
Id. at ES-5 (emphasis in original).
265. 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 64 § 8(6) provides:
When a reinsurance contract has been entered into by the agency and
insurance companies, the director shall notify the department of ecology of
the letting of the contract. Within thirty days of that notification, [the
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legislation, the EPA announced a one-year extension of the
April and October 1990 deadlines for compliance with the
financial responsibility regulations.266 This extension created
two problems. First, state law requires financial responsibility
compliance sooner than federal law. The Department of Ecol-
ogy can probably ignore the legislative directive to enforce the
regulations since the directive references EPA regulations.2 6 7
However, the Department of Ecology may not be able to avoid
the statute's requirement that owners and operators declare
their intended method of compliance because the requirement
exists independent of any EPA requirement or regulation. If
this requirement is enforced, the program can obtain better
information as to the number and types of owners and opera-
tors likely to rely upon the program.
The second problem raises the question of whether insur-
ance companies will seek to participate in the state program
given the enforcement delay. Even if some companies choose
to participate in the state program despite this delay, other
more qualified companies could avoid the program. In either
case, the program will not and cannot accept an insurer's bid
unless the insurer is fully qualified and capitalized to insure
Washington tank owners and operators.2 '
Finally, two program provisions related to insurer accept-
ance of owner and operator insurance applications may cause
an insurer to balk at the prospect of doing business with the
state program. First, owners and operators may obtain cover-
age even if their site is polluted.2 69 Second, owners and opera-
tors who have been rejected or cancelled may appeal the
insurer's decision to the program director.27 °
At first glance, requiring insurers to accept polluted sites
department of ecology] shall notify all known owners and operators of
petroleum underground storage tanks that appropriate levels of financial
responsibility must be established by October 26, 1990, in accordance with
federal [EPA] requirements, and that insurance under the program is
available. All owners and operators of [WSTs] must also be notified that
declaration of method of financial responsibility or intent to seek to be
insured under the program must be made to the state by November 1, 1990
.... [The department of ecology] shall... prohibit the owner or operator...
from . . . receiving petroleum products until such time as financial
responsibility has been established.
266. EPA press release, Thursday, March 15, 1990. 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 64 § 8(b).
267. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.148.005(d)(3) & 70.148.070(d).
268. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 70.148.070(1) & .050(1).
269. See supra text accompanying note 215.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 216-219.
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contradicts other program provisions prohibiting payment for
cleanup of pre-existing pollution. The fundamental problem
associated with insuring polluted sites is the difficulty in suc-
cessfully rejecting a claim for a pre-existing condition because
of the insurer's burden in proving that a release predates the
policy coverage period."7 However, under the program the
policyholder has the burden of proof until the program direc-
tor determines that the owner/operator has a plan for correc-
tive action 2 and that the pre-existing pollution has been
corrected.273 Consequentially, many owners and operators of
polluted sites will not be able to afford clean-up and thus,
these owners and operators will go out of business rather than
apply for insurance.
The director is placed in an awkward position because
enforcement of environmental regulations and monitoring of
clean-up action is the responsibility of the Department of Ecol-
ogy. However, the Department of Ecology cannot declare that
a site has been cleaned up.274 The Department of Ecology can
only certify that the owner or operator has fulfilled any
required corrective action."75 Any decision by the program
director concerning the completion of clean up action that con-
flicts with the Department of Ecology's determinations of
required clean up action will cause inter-agency disputes.
From the owner or operator's perspective, the Department of
Ecology will have the final word on required clean up action.
Given the insurer's direct interest in the program director's
decision that an insured site has been cleaned of prior contami-
nation, the director may be forced to accept the insurer's anal-
ysis of the site or the director may face either complete
alienation of the insurer or potential litigation with the
insurer. The director may declare the insured's site clean and
therefore, the insured owner or operator would no longer have
the burden of proving that a pre-existing release was unrelated
to a new claim. Nevertheless, subsequent investigation may
reveal that the director was wrong in declaring a site clean,
creating disputes between the program and the insurer or the
271. See supra text accompanying notes 82-84 and 107-109.
272. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.148.070(5)(a).
273. WAH. REV. CODE § 70.148.070(5)(b).
274. Letter from Thom Lufkin, Department of Ecology to John Conniff, (Jan. 30,
1989) (copy on file at the University of Puget Sound Law Review).
275. Id.
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insured owner/operator as to who should bear the conse-
quences of such misjudgment.
The second provision creates a more complicated problem.
By permitting owners and operators to appeal the insurer's
decision to reject or cancel insurance coverage the program
director is placed in the position of "super-underwriter." The
director can substitute his or her own underwriting judgment
for the insurance company's judgment. While it can be
expected that the director will carefully incorporate the
insurer's underwriting standards into program regulations and
will attempt to set objective standards for purposes of judging
insurer adherence to program requirements, many insurance
underwriting decisions call for subjective judgment in close
cases. Given that denial of insurance may mean business fail-
ure resulting from noncompliance with financial responsibility
regulations, the director will face extraordinary pressure to
override an insurer's denial of coverage.
The director must also find an objective way to incorpo-
rate the legislative directive to favor owners and operators
whose USTs are relied upon by the local community. In other
words, despite the insurer's clear adherence to underwriting
standards, the director may be compelled to override the
insurer's rejection of a site because of the impact a tank clo-
sure would have upon the affected community. The director
and insurer must come to a clear agreement as to the appropri-
ateness and application of this economic consideration or else
an insurer may avoid business with the state, concluding that
political and social considerations will override sound under-
writing standards. The director must allay such insurer fears
or few, if any, insurers will bid to participate in the state
program.
V. CONCLUSION
Washington state has created a unique program to provide
financial responsibility assurance to owners and operators of
underground petroleum storage tanks. Rather than attempt
direct provision and management of coverage for corrective
action and third party damages, the state will reinsure the lia-
bilities of an existing pollution liability insurance company
who agrees to sell insurance to Washington owners and opera-
tors at a price and upon conditions established by the program
director.
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The program allows voluntary participation by owners and
operators but, conditions acceptance of owners and operators
into the program upon sound underwriting principles. The
program will deviate from sound insurance business practices
only to the extent necessary to assure the availability and
affordability of insurance. For communities relying upon the
presence of particular owners or operators for petroleum
needs, the program can bend the rules to ensure the continu-
ing presence of these owners or operators.
Revenue to fund the program will vary to meet its liabili-
ties and expenses. These liabilities and expenses must be pro-
jected in an actuarily sound manner with appropriate reserves
established. Prices for insurance and reinsurance must com-
port with generally accepted liability insurance standards. If
the program financially collapses, the state has created ave-
nues to escape direct liability for program obligations.
In effect, Washington has created a public reinsurance cor-
poration whose stockholders expect a product sale without a
profit. The state has given program management extraordi-
nary freedom from existing and customary program and insur-
ance statutory restraints. The program director was granted as
many tools as necessary to bargain with and attract an insurer
capable of meeting the program's goals and objectives.
Insurance companies were similarly granted freedom from
insurance statutes and taxes to the extent of their participation
in the program. Unlike traditional state responses to the
unavailability or unaffordability of insurance, no insurance
company will be impressed into state service. The insurance
industry can ignore the Washington program or the industry
can work with the director to create a unique market
opportunity.
The success or failure of the Washington reinsurance
experiment will be measured by the number of owners and
operators whose financial responsibility needs are met. Pro-
gram success will also be measured by the degree to which the
state is protected from unwanted and unanticipated financial
exposure. The pollution liability insurance industry holds the
keys to this success. If the industry ignores or takes unfair
advantage of the program, the program will fail and the oppor-
tunity for similar private/public insurance ventures will be
lost. Washington has gambled that by allowing the state and
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the private sector to do what they each do best, both will
achieve success.
